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Coerced debt wreaks havoc on credit scores, which is particularly problematic
because the use of credit reports is no longer confined to traditional lenders. Employers, landlords, and utility companies all make extensive use of credit scores
when screening potential customers. Thus, a credit score that has been damaged by
coerced debt can make it prohibitively difficult for victims to obtain employment,
housing, or basic utilities—all of which are requirements for establishing an
independent household.
In this Article, I propose amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to allow victims of coerced debt to repair their credit reports. My proposal would enable family
courts to rule on whether alleged coerced debt is, in fact, coerced. The victim could
then submit the court’s certification to the credit reporting agencies, which would
block the coerced debt from her credit report to the extent that the block did not
unduly harm her creditors. My proposal would build a bridge between the decisionmakers already determining issues related to coerced debt and the credit reports
that victims need to have reformed in order to move beyond the abuse.
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INTRODUCTION
Debt and domestic violence are connected in ways not previously imagined. A new type of debt—which I have labeled “coerced debt”—is emerging from abusive relationships.1 Coerced debt occurs when the abuser in a
violent relationship obtains credit in the victim’s name via fraud or duress.
This is a new problem, one enabled by the tremendous growth of consumer
credit markets in recent decades and by the corresponding depersonalization
of the credit system.2 In a previous article, I provided the first published
account of coerced debt.3 Although my work was preliminary and further
study is needed to determine coerced debt’s scope and severity, my research
provides enough evidence to suggest that it is a real problem with a significant impact on its victims.4
Coerced debt is a complex phenomenon with multiple facets and no easy
solutions. My research revealed that batterers engage in an extensive array
of damaging credit transactions, including secretly taking out credit cards in
victims’ names, coercing victims into signing loan documents, and tricking
victims into relinquishing their rights to the family home, among many
others.5 As wide-ranging as these tactics can be, one consequence consistently emerges: ruined credit ratings.6
Thus, in this Article, I propose amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA)7 to enable victims of coerced debt to repair their credit reports.
My proposal would allow family courts handling the divorces of abusive
1 See Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 951, 954-55 (2012) (surveying professionals who work with victims and survivors
of domestic abuse who had been coerced into debt).
2 See, e.g., id. at 986-87 (detailing banks’ transition from face-to-face lending to the mass
mailing of credit cards).
3 See id. at 959-72. There are no other academic articles on coerced debt, and there do not
appear to be any articles on coerced debt in the popular media either. See id. at 959-60 (noting
that “research on coerced debt is almost nonexistent”). The one organization that has reported on
this problem is the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), which has developed advocacy
materials on the consumer rights of domestic violence survivors. See Domestic Violence Survivors,
NAT’L CONSUMER L. C TR., http://www.nclc.org/special-projects/domestic-violence-survivors.
html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (offering various resources to address the “serious financial
concerns” that confront survivors of domestic violence).
4 Littwin, supra note 1, at 959-72.
5 Id. at 986-91.
6 See id. at 997 (noting that victims often do not discover their coerced debt until it is delinquent).
7 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006).
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marriages to rule on whether alleged coerced debt is, in fact, coerced. The
victim could then submit the court’s certification to credit reporting
agencies (CRAs), which would block the reporting of coerced debt to the
extent that this would not unduly harm future creditors. The family court’s
decision would not affect a domestic violence victim’s underlying liability
for the coerced debt,8 but it would enable her to move forward with a credit
report that better reflected her risk profile.
The most important limitation of my proposal is that it applies only to
victims who are divorcing their abusers. It does not help unmarried victims
or those who do not have the means to obtain a divorce. These populations
will require separate remedies, which I will propose after further empirical
study. This Article explores one part of the problem and one possible
solution.9
*
*
*
Coerced debt wreaks havoc on credit scores.10 Victims of coerced debt
often do not discover the debt until they attempt to leave an abusive
relationship, when much of the debt is delinquent or in danger of becoming
so.11 Delinquency occurs in several situations: when the debt is still outstanding; when the abuser has already repaid the debt, but only after it was
in default, thus leaving a negative mark on the victim’s credit report; or
when the debt is so large that the victim is unable to pay it in a timely
manner.12 All of these scenarios can mar a victim’s credit rating at precisely
the point when she most needs a clean bill of credit health.13
The situation would not be as problematic if credit reports were used
only by traditional lenders. The more significant issue is that employers,
landlords, and utility companies make extensive use of credit scores in
8 Liability for coerced debt—as well as preventive measures that could reduce its incidence—
are issues that I plan to explore in future research. I am delaying their consideration until after I
have gathered more definitive empirical data for two primary reasons. First, policy solutions that
remove liability altogether would almost certainly increase costs for creditors more than the
proposal I make in this Article and thus would have correspondingly greater chances of increasing
the cost of credit. Second, coerced debt is so complex that it is especially important to analyze
thoroughly the potential unintended consequences of any policy proposals, which is difficult to do
with preliminary data.
9 The question of whether to give family courts jurisdiction over the financial affairs of unmarried couples is an interesting one that will benefit from future study.
10 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 1001 (noting that advocates for victims of coerced debt “overwhelmingly reported damage to their clients’ credit scores”).
11 In my earlier study, several divorce lawyers stated that most of their clients were unaware
of the coerced debt in their names until their lawyers ran credit checks. Id. at 997-98.
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., id. at 998 (relating the story of one victim who did not know of the loans in her
name until she attempted to take out student loans).
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screening potential employees, tenants, and customers.14 Thus, a credit
score that has been damaged by coerced debt can make it prohibitively
difficult for victims to obtain employment, housing, or basic utilities, all of
which are requirements for establishing an independent household.15
The lawyers and other advocates I interviewed for the coerced debt
study reported that credit ratings tarnished by coerced debt resulted in
longer shelter stays, victims returning to their abusers, or victims making
financial calculations that resulted in them not leaving their abusers in the
first place.16 In other words, the relationship between coerced debt and bad
credit may be an important link in the chain that binds many abusive
relationships.
One major challenge in crafting policy solutions to fix the credit reports
of coerced debt victims is that the process of repairing credit reports is
generally ineffective. Even consumers with less complicated problems than
coerced debt face significant hurdles when attempting to fix their credit
reports.17 This is because the CRAs that collect and distribute consumer
credit data use a dispute-resolution process that is deeply flawed. The CRA
system for investigating alleged errors is almost entirely automated, providing no meaningful review of consumer disputes.18 Consumer claims of
errors are processed through a series of mechanized steps in which no
decisionmaker ever actually evaluates the dispute on its merits. To make
matters worse, the CRAs essentially keep two sets of books.19 The credit
reports provided to consumers do not completely match the reports that
potential creditors see—and neither do the credit scores. The CRAs use two
sets of algorithms when generating reports and scores for these two audiences.20
Because the CRAs have been so ineffective at resolving comparatively
simple consumer disputes, I largely bypass them in my remedy for the more
14
15
16

See infra subsection III.B.2.
Littwin, supra note 1, at 1001-02.
Id. at 1002-03. Empirical research bears out these professionals’ intuition that financial
factors play an important role in a woman’s ability to leave an abusive relationship. See Deborah
K. Anderson & Daniel G. Saunders, Leaving an Abusive Partner: An Empirical Review of Predictors,
the Process of Leaving, and Psychological Well-Being, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 163, 171
(2003) (concluding that “[i]ncome variables were not only among the most consistently related but
possibly the most powerful predictors of the stay/leave decision overall, even when controlling for
a variety of psychological and other variables”).
17 See infra subsection III.A.2. See generally Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139 (2010) (collecting narratives of the hurdles that consumers must jump over to fix
their credit reports).
18 See infra subsection III.A.2.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 120-28.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 120-28.
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complex problem of coerced debt. My proposal takes an alternate approach
and leverages the fact that a segment of coerced debt victims already
encounters a decisionmaker with financial expertise and extensive
knowledge of both parties to the credit abuse: the judges who handle their
divorces. Family courts examine a family’s finances in great detail, engaging
in decisions that we think of as the province of bankruptcy and other
financial courts.21 Divorce courts also make decisions about the most
intimate details of family life, assigning custody and in some states assigning fault for the divorce itself.22 Thus, they are ideally positioned to examine a matter that is at once financial and deeply personal.
Although family courts regularly divide divorcing families’ assets and
debts, their distribution of debt between two ex-spouses is not binding on a
family’s creditors. Creditors are not part of the divorce proceedings, so their
rights continue to be governed by their contracts with individual or multiple family members. If a family court decrees that a debt in Spouse A’s
name should be the responsibility of Spouse B, that gives Spouse A a claim
against Spouse B for the amount of the debt,23 but it does not change
Spouse A’s contract with the creditor. If a family has assets, the court can
achieve a meaningful distribution of debt by awarding Spouse A enough
assets to compensate for the debt, but many divorcing families do not have
significant assets.24
Thus, family courts have limited power to change the distribution of
debt between spouses upon divorce. A proposal to give family courts such
authority would be an immense change that would require a significantly
greater empirical understanding of coerced debt. However, a system in

21 See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 109
S.W.3d 258, 271-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (reviewing in detail a trial court’s valuation of a couple’s
assets).
22 See, e.g., Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (placing fault on the
husband).
23 Nothing in my proposal would prevent family courts from continuing to allocate debt this
way. Although redistributing a couple’s debt has little practical effect on most consumers, some
victims of coerced debt may have the resources to sue their abusers. In addition, it may be
particularly important for family courts in coerced debt cases to make specific findings that the
abuser incurred the debt via duress or fraud. Otherwise, a creditor that later sues a victim may try
to argue that the certification of coerced debt validates the debt’s existence and estops the victim
from asserting claims of duress or fraud.
24 Divorce is frequently associated with negative financial outcomes. For example, a recent
Census survey found that children living with parents who had divorced within the previous year
were more likely to be living in poverty (28%) than other children (19%). DIANA B. ELLIOTT &
TAVIA SIMMONS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL EVENTS OF AMERICANS: 2009, AT 12
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-13.pdf.
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which a family court could certify that certain debts were coerced for
purposes of adjusting a victim’s credit report is more feasible.
Under such a system, a victim of domestic violence could submit a claim
during her divorce that some or all of the debt in her name (or in both
spouses’ names) was acquired without her knowledge or consent. The judge
would then rule on the coerced status of each debt, just as she would on an
allegation that one spouse was entitled to certain property. A victim who
successfully obtained a certification of coerced debt could then submit the
court document to the CRAs, where it would have two effects.
The first effect would be that any debt deemed coerced and that was no
longer outstanding would simply be blocked from the victim’s credit report.
The goal here is to prevent negative payment history about previous
coerced debt from painting the victim as a worse credit risk than she
actually is. Creditors value information about payment history on past debt
because of its predictive power. In this Article, I label this a creditor’s
“predictive interest” in access to credit data. Creditors believe that consumers’ payment tendencies remain relatively stable over time, so that a consumer who paid promptly in the past is likely to pay promptly in the
future.25 But this predictive power is reduced when the consumer did not
acquire the debt voluntarily and may not have been the person managing its
payment. As a result, the creditor’s interest in obtaining that information is
significantly diminished.26
Blocking credit data about past coerced debt would have a major impact
on victims’ credit ratings. Although the CRAs’ credit-scoring algorithms are
proprietary,27 it is likely that payment history heavily influences credit
scores. According to FICO, a major provider of credit scores, payment
history is the most important element of a consumer’s credit record,
comprising 35% of the total, superseding even the amount of debt the
consumer currently has outstanding.28

25 See, e.g., About PLUS Score, EXPERIAN, http://www.protectmyid.com/Message.aspx?Page
TypeID=AboutPlusScore&SiteVersionID=815&SiteID=100302&sc=668893&bcd= (last visited Nov.
16, 2012) (“Higher scores represent a greater likelihood that you’ll pay back your debts so you are
viewed as being a lower credit risk to lenders. A lower score indicates to lenders that you may be a
higher credit risk.”).
26 See infra Section III.A.
27 See JOHN HOWAT, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FULL UTILITY CREDIT REPORTING: RISKS TO L OW INCOME CONSUMERS 8 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/credit_reports/credit_reports_full_utility_dec2009.pdf (noting criticism against CRAs for the
proprietary nature of credit score calculation formulae).
28 What’s in My FICO Score, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/whatsinyour
score.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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However, data on outstanding debt are still very important to creditors.29 Without it, a potential creditor cannot assess the claims on a consumer’s income and assets to determine how many other creditors it will
compete with each month for payment or to evaluate these other creditors’
collection rights in the event of a default. I refer to this as a creditor’s
“current liabilities” interest in a consumer’s credit report. Creditors have a
current liabilities interest in data about all of a consumer’s outstanding
debts, even those not acquired voluntarily. Thus, I limit my proposal for a
complete block of coerced debt to debts that have already been paid off or
are no longer legally binding for other reasons.30 Even though a victim of
coerced debt was not bound consensually to her coerced liabilities, potential
creditors nevertheless need access to information about them if she is bound
legally.
There are, however, competing concerns. Certain users of credit reports—namely employers, landlords, and basic utility companies31—provide
services and benefits that are so essential to recently divorced victims of
domestic violence that, on balance, victims’ needs outweigh the current
liabilities interest of such providers.32 Thus, the second effect of submitting
the coerced debt certification would be that potential employers, landlords,
and basic utility companies would have no access to data about coerced
debt, regardless of whether the debt was still outstanding. The equities for
these entities balance differently than for traditional lenders. A victim of
domestic violence leaving an abusive relationship and starting an independent household can live without a credit card or a mortgage. But without a
job, rental housing, or gas and electricity, she is simply not an economically
viable unit.
In addition, the equities on the other side of the transaction balance differently as well. Employers, landlords, and utilities have different expectations when entering an economic relationship than professional lenders do.
Employers are the easiest case since they are not creditors at all.33 Their
interest in a potential employee’s credit report is in the possible relationship
29
30
31

Outstanding debt comprises 30% of a FICO score. Id.
These reasons include expiration of the statute of limitations or discharge in bankruptcy.
Insurers also use credit report data. E.g., Allstate’s Use of Credit Information to Evaluate Insurance Policies, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstate.com/about/credit.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
However, the advocates I interviewed for my preliminary study did not mention insurance as a
major concern, so I have not included an analysis of it in this Article. This is a topic I will explore
in future empirical research on coerced debt.
32 See infra subsection III.B.2.
33 In fact, employers are debtors of their employees because wages are not paid until some
period after they have been earned. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006) (providing bankruptcy
priority for employees of debtors).
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between a negative credit history and certain negative job-performance
traits.34 But for a judicially certified victim of coerced debt, the negative
credit history is not of her own making and thus much less relevant to her
future job performance.
Landlords and utilities are, in fact, creditors, but their regulatory treatment in all other areas of law is so different than that of lenders that it is
reasonable to treat them differently in this case as well.35 Landlords and
utilities are regulated heavily in recognition of the essential services they
provide, which is exactly why I propose blocking their access to information
about outstanding certified coerced debts. These two types of creditors also
compensate for risk differently than financial-sector creditors, and their risk
management strategies make them less likely than lenders to suffer economic
harm due to a coerced debt block.36
In addition, preliminary empirical evidence37 and logic suggest that financially struggling households are likely to pay their rent and utility bills
before paying down general unsecured debt.38 Credit card issuers, in fact,
encourage the deferral of substantive debt payment by emphasizing the
minimum-payment option.39 Plus, a consumer may be especially likely to
prioritize rental and utility payments over outstanding coerced debt because
she may not consider herself morally responsible for the latter.
My proposal could be implemented by amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act or by promulgating new regulations under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA).40 My ideas build on a current FCRA provision
that allows consumers who have obtained police reports verifying their
identity thefts to compel the CRAs to block records of these transactions
from their credit reports.41 The relative success of this blocking mechanism
demonstrates that it is possible to provide consumers with an effective

34
35
36
37

This relationship is controversial. For a detailed discussion, see infra subsection III.B.2.
See infra subsection III.B.2.
See infra subsection III.B.2.
See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among
Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV 451, 458 n.20 (2008) (discussing how many financially
struggling households triage certain bills, paying them late or negotiating for later payment dates,
in order to pay other bills, including rent, on time).
38 Even if a coerced debt was secured originally, it is unlikely to be relevantly secured from
the victim’s point of view because it will often be for a home in which she no longer lives or a car
to which she no longer has access.
39 See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 375, 387-88 (describing how a 2003 regulator-mandated increase in minimum payments
disrupted many credit card issuers’ business models).
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006).
41 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a).
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error-reduction process within the current system, as long as the remedy
incorporates a non-CRA decisionmaker and eliminates CRA discretion.42
In its current form, however, the FCRA provision excludes many claims
of coerced debt,43 despite the fact that, in many ways, coerced debt is a form
of identity theft.44 In addition, law enforcement officers are not the ideal
decisionmakers for coerced debt claims. My proposal would broaden the
definition of identity theft in coercion cases and replace law enforcement
officers with family courts as the decisionmakers.
Alternatively, implementation could occur under the ECOA. The
ECOA regulations already contain a provision that can be read to cover
coerced debt.45 I propose amending this regulation to make it clear that
coerced debt is included and to make the regulation easier for consumers to
use.46
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I situates coerced debt within
the domestic violence literature and briefly reviews the evidence of the
phenomenon. Part II describes the current, ineffective process the CRAs
use to resolve consumer credit-report disputes and argues that leveraging
the competencies of family courts could improve this process for victims of
coerced debt. Part III considers my policy proposal, explaining its application to traditional lenders as well as to employers, landlords, and utility
companies.
I. COERCIVE CONTROL AND COERCED DEBT
In a recent article, I documented the current evidence for coerced debt,
which I defined to include “all non-consensual, credit-related transactions
that occur in a violent relationship.”47 I presented a preliminary empirical
study in which I interviewed fifty-five lawyers and other advocates who
worked with victims of domestic violence about their clients’ credit problems. Although a wide variety of credit difficulties emerged—ranging from
the scarcity problems common to people living in poverty to mistakes made
because of financial illiteracy—the overarching theme that emerged was

42
43
44
45

See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
See infra subsection III.B.1.
See infra Section II.B.
See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(ii) (2012) (“[I]n evaluating an applicant’s creditworthiness a
creditor shall consider . . . any information the applicant may present that tends to indicate the
credit history being considered by the creditor does not accurately reflect the applicant’s
creditworthiness.”).
46 See infra subsection II.C.3.
47 Littwin, supra note 1, at 954.
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coerced debt.48 This Part contextualizes coerced debt within the broader
framework of domestic violence and briefly summarizes the evidence from
my preliminary study.
Coerced debt appears to be part of a broader pattern of abuse that occurs
within one type of abusive intimate relationships.49 Recent empirical work
suggests that there are two major kinds of domestic abuse: (1) common
couple violence, in which both parties engage in violence as a problemsolving strategy50; and (2) coercive control, in which the abuser asserts
complete dominance over the victim, essentially seeking to undermine the
victim’s free will.51 According to current research, this dominance is typically established by the abuser’s implementation of “regulations” that govern
every aspect of the victim’s behavior and are enforced by frequent and
severe violence.52
Three examples from the leading work on this type of abuse, Evan
Stark’s Coercive Control, illustrate this phenomenon. Professor Stark, a
therapist, documents coercive control with both empirical research and
anecdotal evidence from his own practice.53 In one such anecdote, the
abusive husband required his wife to record her daily activities in fifteenminute increments and then violently interrogated her about her activity
log every night.54 In another case, the husband required his wife to wear
thin, cotton saris at all times.55 Because they lived in a cold climate, this
essentially restricted her to the house for much of the year. In the third
example, the abuser confined his wife in their bedroom suite whenever he
48
49

See id. at 958 (describing research documenting coerced debt).
I recently applied to the National Science Foundation for funding for a study that would,
inter alia, test this hypothesis. I am collaborating in this work with Adrienne Adams, a psychologist at Michigan State University.
50 See Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic
Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1003, 1006 (2006) (identifying “situational couple
violence” as a type of domestic relationship in which both parties may use violence and neither
party is controlling); Michael P. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two
Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 284-85 (1995) [hereinafter
Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism] (differentiating common couple violence from one-sided, controloriented abuse).
51 See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE C ONTROL 257-63 (2007) (stating that controlling partners
view relationships as “zero-sum” games in which the controlled partner’s independence should be
eliminated); Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra note 50, at 284 (defining one-sided abuse that
involves controlling behaviors as “patriarchal terrorism”).
52 See STARK, supra note 51, at 228-88 (documenting the various methods by which abusers
exercise control).
53 See id. at 4 (listing Professor Stark’s professional roles, in which he gathered the examples
he uses in the book).
54 Id. at 294-95.
55 Id. at 239.

374

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 363

left home.56 It is within this type of control-oriented relationships that
coerced debt can exist.57
Research has also begun to document the role that economic tactics play
in coercive control. These tactics fall into two broad categories: preventing
victims from earning money and controlling their access to money the
family has earned. In the first category, some abusers forbid victims from
working outside the home.58 Others interfere with victims’ employment
through tactics such as inflicting visible injuries,59 hiding their work
clothes,60 or harassing their coworkers or bosses.61
Coerced debt falls within the second category of economic abuse: the
establishment of control over household finances. Financial control is often
seized using abusive methods, such as preventing the victim’s access to joint
bank accounts; forcing the victim to deposit income into accounts controlled
solely by the abuser; putting the victim on an allowance; and preventing the
victim from accessing financial information—both about her household’s
finances and about personal finances generally.62 My preliminary research
suggests that financial control can have some striking results: wives who do
not know their husbands’ incomes, their husbands’ occupations, or whether
their families’ residences are rented or owned.63 This control—the ability to
limit the victims’ access to knowledge of the household’s finances—is the

56
57

Id. at 268.
See Littwin, supra note 1, at 981-86 (viewing financial control as the foundation on which
coerced debt can develop).
58 See Rudy J. Aguilar & Narina Nunez Nightingale, The Impact of Specific Battering Experiences
on the Self-Esteem of Abused Women, 9 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 35, 40 (1994) (categorizing prevention
of working as a type of emotional/controlling abuse); Mary P. Brewster, Power and Control
Dynamics in Prestalking and Stalking Situations, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 207, 210 (2003) (listing a
prohibition on working outside the home as one type of financial control); see also Susan Lloyd,
The Effects of Domestic Violence on Women’s Employment, 19 LAW & POL’Y 139, 150-51 tbls.3 & 4
(1997) (documenting the frequency with which partners restricted access to money or made
working outside the home difficult).
59 E.g., Angela M. Moe & Myrtle P. Bell, Abject Economics: The Effects of Battering and Violence on Women’s Work and Employability, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 29, 40 (2004) (documenting one woman’s difficulty keeping a job because she missed work due to frequent injuries).
60 E.g., Ruth A. Brandwein & Diana M. Filiano, Toward Real Welfare Reform: The Voices of
Battered Women, 15 AFFLIA 224, 233 (2000).
61 See, e.g., id. (recounting how some women leave their jobs out of fear of what their husbands would do to their employers); Melanie Shepard & Ellen Pence, The Effect of Battering on the
Employment Status of Women, AFFLIA, Summer 1988, at 55, 58 (reporting that 24% of victims
claimed that abuse led, in part, to a loss of employment).
62 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 981-86.
63 Id. at 985-86.
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foundation that underlies coerced debt,64 enabling abusers to perpetuate
long-term financial fraud and coercion.
There appear to be limitless tactics by which abusers generate coerced
debt. These include applying for credit cards in a partner’s name without
the partner’s knowledge; using physical duress to force a partner to apply
for credit cards; threatening violence against the partner or her children
toward the same end; forging a partner’s signature on home mortgage
documentation to, for example, withdraw equity from the family home;
employing a combination of fraud and force to induce a partner to sign a
quitclaim deed for the family home; arranging the household’s secured
transactions so that the debt is in the victim’s name while the collateral asset
is in the abuser’s; and impersonating a partner to obtain a car loan.65
I include within the term “coerced debt” behavior that falls under the
traditional legal definition of fraud66 as well as behavior more properly
characterized as duress.67 The role duress plays in coerced debt is easy to
see. If an abuser holds a gun to a victim’s head and instructs her to fill out a
credit application, that is clearly coercive. But in relationships permeated
with coercive control, fraud also plays a role in coerced debt. For example,
an abuser might hold a gun to a victim’s head and instruct her to sign a loan
application without permitting her to read it. Alternatively, an abuser might
borrow in the victim’s name without her knowledge. When she discovers
the debt and asks the abuser about it, he might then put the gun to her head
and instruct her to leave it alone. A third possibility is that the victim
discovers the debt but is too afraid to ask the abuser about it. In all of these
hypothetical situations, the abuser sustains the fraud by using elements of
duress. Even in cases without direct financial coercion, much fraud in
abusive relationships likely evades detection through other abusive tactics,
such as controlling the victim’s access to financial records, stealing the
victim’s mail, or monitoring the victim’s telephone calls.68
The advocates I interviewed explained that batterers engaged in this
behavior partly to gain economic enrichment, but also to maintain control
within the abusive relationship. Several of my interviewees noted that, in
many of these cases, abusers intended to limit their victims’ options and

64
65
66

Id. at 981-86.
See id. at 986-97.
“A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce
another to act to his or her detriment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009).
67 “Broadly, a threat of harm made to compel a person to do something against his or her will
or judgment . . . .” Id. at 578.
68 Littwin, supra note 1, at 973-78.
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make it more difficult for them to leave.69 A victim’s inability to start an
economically viable household on her own creates a major barrier to leaving. As one psychologist I interviewed stated, the abuser’s objective is “to
keep [the victim] from having alternatives to the relationship.”70
To be fair, only the most sophisticated batterers probably thought of
financial abuse in terms of negative credit ratings. Their immediate concerns may have been issues such as keeping victims financially illiterate and
arranging their families’ affairs so that all of the assets are in their names
and the debts in the names of their victims.71 Victims would have difficulty
leaving the relationship because they would be financially naïve and would
owe hundreds or thousands of dollars in unanticipated debt.
But my research suggests that credit reporting is, indeed, a major barrier
to leaving and remaining free of abusive relationships. Many of the lawyers
and other advocates I interviewed discussed credit reporting and its consequences as barriers for victims.72 As I reported previously:
[O]ne lawyer who staffs a family law hotline stated, “My major concern is
her credit report.” Another said, “Oh yeah, that’s really common. There’s
no good way around it.” Other advocates said that it “absolutely” was an
issue and that they see it “over and over again” or “all the time.” One social
worker stated that her clients’ credit ratings were ruined “almost across the
board.”73

My interviewees described how these poor credit ratings directly interfered with victims’ attempts to establish self-sufficiency. More than a dozen
reported that negative credit scores prevented their clients from obtaining
housing, employment, and basic utilities.74 One legal clinical professor
characterized the intersection of coerced debt with landlord and employer
use of credit reports as “really hurt[ing] DV survivors.”75
Several of the lawyers and other advocates I interviewed stated that the
inability to obtain employment and housing resulted in longer shelter
stays.76 One lay advocate explained, “Often the emotional crisis issues and
physical safety issues are in better shape after 30-90 days. But then she’s left
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 999.
Id. (alteration in original).
See id. at 961 tbl.1 (listing several methods of establishing coerced debt).
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1001 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002 (attributing overcrowding in domestic violence (DV) shelters in part to victims’
inability to find housing on account of their poor credit scores).
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living in this shelter situation longer than she needs it. Nobody will rent to
her and her children, and nobody will open utilities in her name.”77
Of even greater concern is the fact that, according to several advocates,
bad credit is a major reason why many victims remain in abusive relationships.78 They made statements such as, “[H]aving a bad credit score . . .
creates even more barriers to her being able to successfully extract herself
from that relationship;” and, “If there were options for women getting their
credit back, I think it would go a long way toward helping” them leave.79
The following Parts explore one such option.
II. WHO DECIDES? CREDIT REPORTING’S
DECISIONMAKING DEFICIT
On close examination, the most striking feature of our credit reporting
system is the absence of a decisionmaker at the heart of the process. Although
credit reports play a crucial role in consumers’ financial lives, the system is
so automated that no person has the authority to decide exactly which
pieces of information belong in an individual consumer’s report.80
In 2003, Congress decided that this automation was unacceptable with
respect to identity theft and enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)81 as an amendment to the FCRA. The new congressionally mandated system is still semiautomated, but it provides for some
decisionmaking authority by relying on law enforcement agencies to
screen claims of identity theft.82 In the area of coerced debt, however, law
enforcement authorities are unsuited for their roles as de facto decisionmakers.83 Thus, my proposal builds upon the identity theft procedure
but designates family court as the appropriate decisionmaking forum.
The CRAs do, of course, have rules that determine how data are selected
for inclusion in credit reports; beyond these parameters, however, the
system is fully automated.84 The CRAs use computer programs to process

77
78
79
80

Id.
Id. at 1002-03.
Id. at 1002.
See generally Wu, supra note 17 (providing an overview of the credit reporting system and
detailing the failings of its credit dispute process).
81 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.).
82 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e) (2006).
83 See infra text accompanying notes 196-99.
84 See generally Wu, supra note 17.
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information from current creditors and other furnishers85 and repackage it
for viewing by consumers and future creditors—all without any human
supervision over the generated content.86
Given the massive amounts of data that circulate in our consumer credit
system,87 this is a reasonable, and indeed necessary, way for the process to
begin. But two problems emerge. First, the rules used by the CRAs for
selecting data for inclusion on credit reports virtually guarantee that there
will be a high error rate.88 Second, no decisionmaker has authority to review
and fix credit reports in which errors are found. The CRA internal error
investigation process relies on a combination of automated computer
processes and low-level employees lacking discretion. The absence of a
decisionmaker means no authority exists to which victims of coerced debt
can appeal to argue that fraudulent or duress-generated debt should be
excluded from their credit reports.89
FACTA improved the process by adding a procedure that enables victims of identity theft to correct their credit reports by blocking fraudulent
data.90 This process has been unavailing for many victims of coerced debt,
even though coerced debt is in part a form of identity theft. Nevertheless,
the blocking provision lays the groundwork upon which I build my proposal. It demonstrates successful intervention in a system as mechanized as
credit reporting. I would broaden the statute to include all forms of coerced
debt and substitute a decisionmaker with better institutional capacity for
reviewing coerced debt allegations.
The FCRA essentially deputizes law enforcement authorities to determine whether identity theft has occurred,91 but law enforcement agencies
lack the expertise in finances or family relations to handle coerced debt.
85 Furnishers are entities that report consumer financial behavior to the CRAs. The term
includes past creditors and public records keepers. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON T HE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISPUTE PROCESS 4 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 FTC REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/fcradispute/P044808fcradisputeprocessreporttocongress.
pdf (listing examples of entities considered “furnishers”).
86 See id. at 150-53 (documenting CRAs’ reliance on furnisher-provided information).
87 A few brief statistics about credit cards illustrate the scope of the consumer credit system
in the United States. As of 2009, there were 156 million credit card holders and over 1.2 billion
credit cards. That year, credit card purchases totaled $1.94 trillion and the outstanding credit card
debt reached $886 billion. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2012, at 740 tbl.1188 (131st ed. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2012/tables/12s1188.pdf.
88 See infra subsection II.A.1.
89 See infra subsection II.A.2.
90 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2 (2006).
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(4) (requiring an identity theft report to be filed with the appropriate law enforcement agency).
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Family courts, on the other hand, are equipped to adjudicate complex
transactions that occur among family members. Indeed, they already make
determinations about both domestic violence and family finances,92 and, in
doing so, consider an issue closely related to coerced debt. In the states that
allow courts to balance the equities of the case when distributing assets and
debts,93 many judges consider whether domestic violence has occurred.94
The only difference is that family courts’ current debt distributions have no
effect on credit reports. My proposal would build a bridge between those
already making difficult determinations about issues related to coerced debt
and the reformation of credit reports victims need in order to move beyond
the abuse.
A. The Credit Reporting Agencies’ Failings
The CRAs have done such a poor job of producing accurate credit reports
that they cannot be trusted with the complex and sensitive matter of
coerced debt. Many of the errors plaguing credit reports are consequences
not of any type of fraud, but rather of the standard CRA system for generating reports. The CRAs have equally inadequate procedures for rectifying
mistakes, which indicates that they do not have the capacity to make
decisions about errors resulting from coerced debt.
1. Inaccurate Credit Reporting
It is virtually indisputable that consumer credit reports contain a large
number of errors. As Professor Lynn LoPucki wrote in 2001, “The number
of errors in the system are acceptable from the standpoint of lending
creditors, but generally appalling from the standpoint of the individual
consumer.”95 In 2009, more than eleven million consumers experienced
some form of identity theft.96 That number does not include additional

92
93

See infra subsection II.C.1.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502
(2008) (allowing the equitable division of marital property in an action for divorce); TEX. FAM .
CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West 2006) (“[T]he court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in
a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and
any children of the marriage.”).
94 See infra note 225.
95 Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 89, 102 (2001).
96 CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW C TR., FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING § 9.1 (7th ed. 2010).
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errors introduced by the CRAs who collect credit data and the furnishers
who provide them.97
A brief sampling of statistics indicates the magnitude of the problem.
Four small-scale studies yielded credit report error percentages ranging
from 31%98 to 53%99 to 70%100 to 79%.101 Three of these studies also reported
the percentage of credit reports containing errors significant enough to
result in a denial of credit. These serious-error rates ranged from 12%102 to
25%103 to 29%.104 Moreover, all of these studies used credit reports ordered
by consumers, which, as explained below, are more likely to be accurate
than the ones produced for lenders and other users of credit data.105 A 2002
study of credit reports generated by mortgage applications found that 10%
contained one specific error: data from at least one additional consumer.106
A 2005 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found
that 18% of surveyed consumers had filed a dispute about their credit
reports at some point.107 Even a report to the FTC by the Consumer Data
Industry Association (CDIA), the CRAs’ trade association, found that
21.8% of consumers who ordered their credit reports in 2003 filed a dispute
that led to an investigation by a CRA.108 More startling is the statistic that,
97
98

See id. at 121-22 (detailing how CRA credit files are built and how errors arise).
See FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS A CT OF 2003, at 7 tbl.2 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 FTC
REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/12/P044804factarptcongress.pdf (studying the
reports of 128 consumers, although possible overrepresentation of higher-income, higher-score
participants could have resulted in an underreporting of errors).
99 See L. DOUGLAS SMITH ET AL., PROCESSES FOR DETERMINING ACCURACY OF CREDIT
BUREAU INFORMATION 14 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/FACTACT/FACT
_Act_Report_2006_Exhibits_1-12.pdf (reporting on a preliminary study of thirty consumers
conducted for the FTC’s 2006 Report to Congress).
100 See JON GOLINGER WITH EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN : CREDIT REPORT ERRORS MEAN CONSUMERS LOSE 7 (1998), available at http://cdn.publicinterestnet
work.org/assets/UDV-IZWNPfc9VDuHy9q4wA/mistakesdohappen3_98.pdf
(studying
the
reports of 133 consumers).
101 See ALISON CASSADY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A L OOK
AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 13 (2004), available at http://georgiapirg.org/
sites/pirg/files/reports/MistakesDoHappen2004-1.pdf (studying the reports of 154 consumers).
102 2008 FTC REPORT, supra note 98, at 7 tbl.2.
103 CASSADY & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 101, at 11.
104 GOLINGER WITH MIERZWINSKI, supra note 100, at 5.
105 See infra text accompanying notes 116-26.
106 See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT
SCORE ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 21 (2002), available at http://www.
consumerfed.org/pdfs/121702CFA_NCRA_Credit_Score_Report_Final.pdf.
107 U.S. G OV’ T A CCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-223, CREDIT R EPORTING LITERACY: CONSUMERS UNDERSTOOD THE BASICS BUT COULD BENEFIT FROM TARGETED
EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS 28 (2005).
108 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 12 (2006).
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in 2009, reports of identity theft comprised 21% of all complaints to the
FTC, a greater percentage than that of such seedy items as shop-at-home
sales, foreign-currency scams, and sweepstakes.109
One industry-financed study did find an error rate under 3%,110 but this
research is flawed. It counted a data point as inaccurate only if the consumer
was denied credit on the basis of the error, filed a dispute with the CRA,
won that dispute, and succeeded in persuading the lender or other entity to
reverse its earlier denial of credit.111 This error rate thus excluded consumers
who received higher-priced credit as the result of errors, those who chose
not to file disputes, those who lost their disputes with the CRAs, and those
who were able to correct their reports but failed to obtain credit from the
original source.
An understanding of why there are so many inaccuracies requires a brief
explanation of how credit reports are generated. The first step is the CRAs
regularly downloading large quantities of data from “furnishers,”112 a group
that includes lenders and other entities that report on consumer financial
behavior.113 CRA algorithms then match each downloaded record to a
consumer in their database.114 This matching process can be designed to be
stricter or looser, by adjusting how closely a downloaded record must match
an existing consumer file for the files to be merged.115 A strict system would
require, for example, identical names, addresses, and social security numbers
before two records could be merged.
Creditors, however, tend to prefer looser algorithms—thus ensuring that
they see all potential negative information about consumers applying for
credit 116—and this approach appears to be the one that CRAs take. The
109 FTC, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009,
at 6 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2009.
pdf. In 2006, this figure was 36%. Credit Reports: Consumers’ Ability to Dispute and Change Inaccurate
Information: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 100th Cong. app. 57-58 (2007) [hereinafter
Consumers’ Ability to Dispute] (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett).
110 FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND 319 OF THE FAIR AND
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at 25-26 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 FTC
REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf.
111 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.1.3.5.
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (2006) (detailing the responsibilities of furnishers in providing
information to CRAs).
113 See infra note 135.
114 See WU & DE A RMOND, supra note 96, § 4.3.3.2 (describing the process by which CRAs
build their files); see also County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d
383, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing matching procedures to generate business credit reports),
aff’d, No. 04-2982, 2005 WL 3117211 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2005).
115 See 2004 FTC R EPORT, supra note 110, at 35-55.
116 See, e.g., What Borrowers Need to Know About Credit Scoring Models and Credit Scores: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong.
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National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), which has compiled a thousandpage manual on credit reporting,117 directly attributes the high error rate in
consumer reports to loose computer algorithms. “Mismerged files occur
largely because the CRAs’ computers do not use sufficiently rigorous score
or scale thresholds to match consumer data precisely, even when such
unique identifiers as Social Security numbers are present.”118 Privacy expert
Evan Hendricks has described how this works in practice:
The general rule is if seven out of the nine digits [of two consumers’ Social
Security numbers] match, they consider that a partial match, provided that
some of the name information will match up as well. So, people who have
only one or two digits different in their Social Security numbers and have
enough common letters in their names and live in the same geographic region could be considered to be the same person by the computers, and that
causes a mixed file.119

Loose algorithms introduce even more errors when lenders order reports
for the purpose of deciding whether to extend credit. The problem is that
the CRAs use one set of parameters when generating reports for consumers
and another when generating them for users.120 The CRAs use relatively
complete matching algorithms with consumers but partial matching with
users, which means that users may see negative or erroneous data not
available to consumers ordering their own credit reports.121 Hendricks refers
to the scores consumers can purchase with their reports as “FAKO”
scores—a play on words on FICO credit scores.122 This discrepancy means
that the credit reports used to determine creditworthiness are even less

app. 122 (2008) [hereinafter What Borrowers Need to Know] (testimony of Evan Hendricks, Editor,
Privacy Times) (stating that user versions of credit reports often have more information because
“the CRAs attempt to include in them the maximum possible information that might relate to the
consumer—in essence, so no negative item is missed”).
117 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96.
118 Id. at 121.
119 Leslie McFadden, The Dark Side of Credit Reports and Scores, BANKRATE.COM ( Jul. 17,
2007, 3:00 AM), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/pf_article_103239.html (interview
with Evan Hendricks); see also Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 65 (testimony of
Leonard A. Bennett) (“If two consumers have a similar name, even if not exact, and also share
either an address or a social security number matching seven of nine digits, the CRAs will very
often combine the two files.”).
120 What Borrowers Need to Know, supra note 116, at app. 122-23 (testimony of Evan Hendricks).
121 One reason that this type of loose matching occurs is because users are not required to
submit social security numbers to obtain consumer reports. 2004 FTC REPORT, supra note 110, at
38. As the NCLC reports, “as many as 10% of all inquiries [from users] do not include a valid
Social Security number.” WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.3.4.
122 What Borrowers Need to Know, supra note 116, at app. 121 (testimony of Evan Hendricks).
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accurate than consumer surveys would indicate. Furthermore, consumers
have no opportunity to dispute information provided only to users before it
results in a denial of credit.123
The difference in the reports that consumers and users receive may reflect an understanding that the partial matching system the CRAs use for
creditors would not be acceptable to the general public. The CRAs ban
resellers from providing consumers with the user versions of their credit
reports,124 and the formulas the CRAs use to calculate scores are proprietary
and protected as trade secrets.125 As such, the only way for a consumer to
obtain the user version of her credit report is to apply for credit, be denied
that credit, and then invoke a FACTA provision that allows consumers to
request the report obtained by the lender during the credit check.126
It is rational for the CRAs to prioritize creditor interests over consumer
interests in generating credit reports because consumers are not the CRAs’
customer base. Since FACTA’s implementation, consumers have been able
to obtain their credit reports without charge annually and in certain other
circumstances,127 so CRAs have limited incentives to compete for consumer
business. The one area in which the CRAs do compete for consumer
business is in providing credit report monitoring services,128 but selling
services consumers can use to correct their reports may actually decrease
CRA incentives to ensure the accuracy of reports before consumers purchase these services.
Instead, the CRAs’ main revenue source is the users who purchase credit
reports.129 The FTC has explained how competition for creditor business
might result in high error rates:
[L]enders may prefer to see all potentially derogatory information about a
potential borrower, even if it cannot all be matched to the borrower with
certainty. This preference could give the CRAs an incentive to design algorithms that are tolerant of mixed files, which could harm consumers to
whom the derogatory information is mistakenly assigned.130

123 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 3.7.2.1 (“[P]ractitioners report that CRAs will hide
information in the report to the consumer by truncating or deleting account numbers, or deleting
subscriber addresses, which hinders a consumer in directly disputing an account with a creditor.”).
124 What Borrowers Need to Know, supra note 116, at app. 120 (testimony of Evan Hendricks).
125 HOWAT, supra note 27, at 1.
126 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h) (2006).
127 Id.
128 See Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 84 (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett).
129 See id. (“And despite the growing profits in credit monitoring services, the CRAs make
most of their money from these collecting creditors.”).
130 2004 FTC REPORT, supra note 110, at 47.
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2. Flawed Credit Report Repair
Once a consumer discovers an error, the process does not improve.
There is ample evidence that many consumers have an excruciating time
restoring their credit reports after discovering inaccuracies. Victims of
identity theft and other errors can spend hundreds of hours in this process131
and are often unsuccessful.132 The judicial opinions in this area show that
consumers who attempt to fix their credit reports frequently file multiple
complaints with CRAs before resorting to litigation.133
This difficulty is a direct result of the flawed process the CRAs employ
to investigate disputes. The CRAs do not appear to conduct investigations
of consumer error complaints,134 but rather refer each disputed item to the
furnisher who supplied it.135 This process is almost entirely automated.136
Upon receipt of a consumer dispute, the CRA will condense it to fit on
a one-page form, where it is represented by a two-digit code.137 This
condensation occurs regardless of how much information the consumer has
provided about the alleged inaccuracy. The standardized electronic form

131 A 2010 study found that, on average, victims of identity theft spent 21 hours and $373
resolving the issue. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2010 I DENTITY FRAUD SURVEY
REPORT 5 (2010), available at https://www.javelinstrategy.com/uploads/files/1004.R_2010Identity
FraudSurveyConsumer.pdf. Another study found that victims of identity theft spent an average of
68 hours resolving its effects. IDENTITY THEFT RES. C TR., I DENTITY THEFT: THE
AFTERMATH 2009, AT 20 (2010), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/
1/Aftermath_2009_20100520.pdf.
132 In their book, Wu and De Armond report the results of a 2007 Zogby poll finding that
37% of consumers who ordered their credit reports discovered errors and that half of them had
difficulty correcting these inaccuracies. See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.1.3.5 ; see also
Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U.
PITT. L. REV. 343, 359-60 (2003) (“Victims report that even after they demonstrate that fraud
occurred, lenders refuse to take steps to prevent further damage from occurring, and persist in
attributing the thieves’ transactions to the victims. Consumer reporting agencies are said to be
particularly uncooperative.” (citation omitted)).
133 See, e.g., Konter v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 960, 965 (W.D. Wis. 2009)
(describing how the plaintiff and his lawyer filed five dispute letters before his twin sister’s
information was removed from his credit report); Saenz v. TransUnion, L.L.C., 621 F. Supp. 2d
1074, 1078-79 (D. Or. 2007) (noting that the plaintiff filed two disputes and a lawsuit before false
information was corrected); see also WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.1.1 (“Consumers
often are forced to file multiple disputes, then file litigation, before their credit reports are
corrected.”).
134 See, e.g., Gorman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 07-1846, 2008 WL 4934047, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting the deposition of an Experian official who stated “we don’t do
any other independent investigations” besides relying upon the furnisher).
135 See supra note 85.
136 See 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 15 n.87 (noting that FACTA requires CRAs to
offer an automated system for furnishers to report the results of their investigations).
137 For a sample form, see id. at appendix C.
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does contain a one-line field that employees can use to add more information, but this field is used in only 30% of cases.138
Although the system contains twenty-six dispute codes, often listed in a
drop-down menu,139 most of them are rarely used. According to furnisher
reports, 30-40% of disputes arrive with “generic or catch-all dispute
codes.”140 A high-profile consumer attorney claims that the same five
generic codes are used nearly 90% of the time: “Not his/hers” (30.5%);
“Disputes present/previous Account Status/History” (21.2%); “Claims Inaccurate Information, Did not provide specific dispute” (16.8%); “Disputes
Amounts” (8.8%); and “Claims account closed by consumer” (7.0%).141
The CRAs do not forward any documentation to furnishers, even
though they advise consumers submitting disputes to include documentation such as billing statements or letters from their creditors.142 The “Big
Three” CRAs (Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion) actually have a policy
of not forwarding these documents to the furnishers evaluating the accuracy
of consumer disputes.143 In fact, the CRAs’ electronic system is not even
capable of transmitting a consumer’s documentation.144 Equifax states,
however, that it sometimes faxes documentation and that furnishers can
request it.145
Furnishers, in turn, have blamed the CRA system for not giving them
enough information to conduct more than superficial investigations.146 As a
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 17.
WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.6.2.
2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 17.
Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 82 (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett).
See, e.g., EXPERIAN, http://www.experian.com/disputes/how-to-dispute.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining how to request an investigation); Dispute Information on Your Credit
Report, (same); Online Dispute, EQUIFAX, https://www.ai.equifax.com/CreditInvestigation (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012) (same); Request for Investigation, TRANSUNION, http://www.transunion.com/
docs/personal/InvestigationRequest_Chester.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (same).
143 See, e.g., Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09-0646, 2010 WL 3749454,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010) (citing the testimony of a TransUnion team leader who stated that
“Trans Union, as a matter of policy, never forwards material submitted by consumers to the
original source”); 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 18 (stating that TransUnion typically does
not forward consumer-supplied documentation to furnishers).
144 See Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 76-77 (testimony of Leonard A.
Bennett) (quoting a deposition from a vice president at Equifax).
145 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 18.
146 E.g., Letter from Christopher T. Curtis, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Capital One, to Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, et al. (May 22, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/FACTA-furnishers/522110-00083.pdf, commenting on Interagency Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Procedures to Enhance the Accuracy and Integrity of Information
Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies Under Section 312 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 14,419 (Mar. 22, 2006); see also Westra v. Credit Control of
Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that furnisher-defendant’s investigation “was
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result, the standard furnisher practice is to verify that the relevant consumer
does, in fact, have an account and that the consumer’s basic information is
correct.147 But this practice does nothing to address whether, for example,
the account in the consumer’s name was fraudulently obtained. When a
CRA receives verification from the furnisher of the existence of an account,
it considers the consumer’s complaint meritless, even if the response does
not address the point that the consumer is disputing.148
Throughout this process, the CRA employees who handle the disputes
have virtually no discretion. Two of the “Big Three” CRAs outsource their
dispute processes internationally.149 Employees are evaluated on meeting
“quality” and “production” targets, with “quality” defined as following the
steps in the employee manuals and “production” meaning the number of
disputes they process.150 The CRAs generally do not allow their employees
to contact any live human beings, such as the consumers or the furnishers,
in conducting their investigations.151 The only changes these employees are
usually authorized to make to consumer credit reports are those that
proceed directly from furnisher responses.152
In a sign that the CRAs may realize that their investigation processes
are compromised, the agencies maintain lists of “VIPs,” such as celebrities,
lawyers, and politicians, whose reports of inaccuracies are investigated
through a more thorough process.153 For Equifax and TransUnion, this
special treatment appears to mean using U.S.-based employees to conduct
the investigations, rather than outsourcing these disputes.154
Even in the rare case that a consumer does manage to have an inaccuracy
corrected, there is still a significant chance that the erroneous information
will be reinserted at a later date. Despite the FCRA requirement that the
reasonable given the scant information it received” from the CRA); Malm v. Household Bank,
No. 03-4340, 2004 WL 1559370, at *4 (D. Minn. July 7, 2004) (finding a furnisher’s investigation
sufficient given its limited information).
147 See, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing a
cursory review conducted by a furnisher to verify information); Plaintiff’s Complaint at 4-5,
United States v. Credit Bureau Collection Servs., No. 10-169 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2010) (describing a furnisher’s procedures for processing disputes).
148 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.4.2.
149 See id. at 181 (describing Equifax’s and TransUnion’s outsourcing); Consumers’ Ability to
Dispute, supra note 109, at 42 (statement of Leonard A. Bennett) (stating that TransUnion uses a
vendor in India).
150 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.6.4.
151 Id.
152 Id.; see also id. (“Each of the ‘Big Three’ CRAs also concedes that their employees are not
permitted to exercise any personal discretion.”).
153 Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 59-60 (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett).
154 Id.
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CRA correct or delete inaccurate information,155 when the change to be
made is the deletion of an account, “the CRAs will only ‘soft-delete’ the
account, invoking a function that suppresses or cloaks the information while
still leaving it in the database.”156 So if the creditor changes the account
number or the account is sold, the suppression will no longer hold.157
If all else fails, a consumer does have the right to file a statement of dispute explaining that she believes certain information in her report to be
inaccurate.158 The CRA must then insert it in the credit report. Approximately 30% of consumers who have been unsuccessful in challenging their
credit reports use this remedy.159 But it is largely ineffective. The statement
of dispute is usually inserted at the bottom of the report, and creditors often
do not see it or give it much weight.160
The main benefit of automation is that it generates revenue for the
CRAs. The CRAs spend well under $1.00 per dispute on processing,161 less
than what the CRAs charge creditors each time a consumer submits a
dispute about data that a creditor provided.162 In fact, the CRAs’ online
processing system has become so profitable that the CRAs moved it from
their nonprofit trade association, where it was created, to a for-profit
company of which the three major CRAs each own a share.163 The revenue
generation function of credit report errors undoubtedly enables the CRAs
to keep their prices low. Charges for initial credit checks range from $1.25 to
$3.00 per credit check, along with a $500 annual fee.164
The savings to creditors may be passed on to some consumers in the
form of lower credit costs and higher credit availability, but the sacrifice in
accuracy means that these benefits will not be distributed appropriately.
Consumers who are denied credit because of errors in their reports do not
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A) (2006).
WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.6.2.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b).
2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 22.
See, e.g., WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 14.7.4.
WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.6.4 n.918. See also, Consumers’ Ability to Dispute,
supra note 109, at 42 (statement of Leonard A. Bennet) (“Equifax outsources all of its reinvestigation to a company in the Philippines that is paid 57 cents per dispute . . . .”).
162 See id. § 4.5.6.1 (explaining that the e-Oscar electronic system handles consumer disputes).
163 Id.
164 See Shelby Grad, Trans Union Wins Credit Report Contract, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at
B2 (reporting that TransUnion won the bid to provide Orange County with credit-reporting
services for one year with a price of $1.25 per credit check); Ed Sacks, Landlords Go High-Tech to
Check Credit, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at 16 (reporting that larger property management
firms can get credit reports for $3.00 each from national providers by paying an annual membership fee of $500).
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benefit from lower credit prices or greater credit availability. And any
pricing benefits that emerge are cancelled out for consumers who are
charged higher prices due to credit reporting errors. In addition, the
consumers who spend extraordinary amounts of time and money repairing
damage to their credit reports165 are almost certainly not receiving any net
benefit. In many ways, these unlucky few are cross-subsidizing any lower
prices or increased credit availability experienced by the rest of the consumer population.
These CRA investigation practices persist despite a legal regime that
would appear to require much more. Under the FCRA, the CRAs are
required to conduct “reasonable” investigations of all consumer disputes.166
When conducting these investigations, CRAs must do more than blindly
defer to the furnisher; they have three main sub-duties. First, they must
provide the furnisher with “all relevant information regarding the dispute
that the agency has received from the consumer.”167 Second, the CRAs must
reasonably investigate the matter. 168 Third, the CRAs must “promptly
delete [inaccurate] information from the file of the consumer, or modify
that item of information, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation.” 169 Once inaccurate information has been deleted, “the information may not be reinserted in the file by the consumer reporting agency

165
166
167

See supra note 131.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006).
Id. § 1681i(a)(2)(A). It is an open question whether the CRAs’ policy of not forwarding
consumer-provided documents to the furnishers violates this provision. Compare Dixon-Rollins v.
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09-0646, 2010 WL 3749454, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010)
(affirming liability for TransUnion for failing to re-investigate plaintiff’s dispute), and Mullins v.
Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 305-888, 2007 WL 2471080, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2007) (upholding judgment against TransUnion for willfully violating the FCRA by failing to investigate), with
Morris v. Trans Union, 420 F. Supp. 2d 733, 740-41 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that TransUnion’s
failure to develop policies and procedures for verifying creditor information did not amount to
“willfulness”), and Konter v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 960, 971-72 (W.D. Wis.
2009) (finding no violation and holding that the FCRA requires CRAs to forward only relevant
information).
168 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). In determining what constitutes a “reasonable” investigation,
courts use a balancing test. See, e.g., Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225-26 (3d Cir.
1997) (weighing the extent of information the defendant had against the cost of investigation).
Even the most CRA-friendly cases use this balancing test. See, e.g., Lee v. Experian Info.
Solutions, No. 02-8424, 2003 WL 22287351, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2003) (using the balancing test
to uphold summary judgment for defendant). Despite these tests, the CRAs publicly maintain
that they have no duty to look beyond the automated verifications they receive from furnishers.
WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.3.4.5.
169 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i).
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unless the person who furnishes the information certifies that the information is complete and accurate.” 170
There are volumes of case law on the issue, much of it finding CRA
procedures to violate the FCRA,171 and the CRAs have entered into consent
decrees with the FTC and state attorneys general.172 Yet these remedies
have proven ineffective in generating change.
Part of the problem appears to be that there are not enough lawyers
practicing in this area to enable a density of lawsuits that would change
CRA incentives.173 Another issue is that the FTC did not have adequate
tools to change CRA practices, both in terms of resources and enforcement
authority.174 The Dodd-Frank Act relocated regulatory responsibility for the
FCRA to the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), which has more direct enforcement powers than the FTC did. The
CFPB has the authority to supervise “larger participant[s] of a market for
other consumer financial products or services,”175 and one of its first acts
after the appointment of its director was to issue a proposed rule that would
define CRAs as larger market participants.176 This authority would enable
the CFPB to implement my policy proposal more effectively than the FTC
would have been able to do.

170 Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(B)(i). The “soft-delete” system that the CRAs use arguably violates these
requirements, and two courts have found this procedure unreasonable or potentially unreasonable.
Cousin v. Trans Union, Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the practice of softdeleting unreasonable); Jordan v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1358 (N.D.
Ga. 2006) (categorizing the soft-delete at issue as an “unexplained ‘glitch’”—not defendant’s
practice—and thus finding the CRA’s procedure reasonable).
171 See Cousin, 246 F.3d at 368 (holding that the defendant knew about the problems with its
cloaking procedure and was negligent in not fixing them).
172 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, app. K (summarizing enforcement orders secured by
law enforcement agencies against CRAs); see also The Consumer Reporting Act of 1993: Hearing on
H.R. 1015 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 316 n.1 (1993) (statement of Oakley Orser, Vice President of Credit,
Belk Ctr., Inc.) (referencing an Equifax agreement with eighteen state attorneys general).
173 The NCLC’s Chi Chi Wu estimates that there are somewhere between a few dozen and a
couple hundred U.S. lawyers practicing in this area. Telephone Interview with Chi Chi Wu, Staff
Att’y, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. (Aug. 19, 2011).
174 Id.
175 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011).
176 Defining Larger Participants in Certain Consumer Financial Products and Services Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,059 (proposed June 29, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. X) [hereinafter
CFPB Proposed Rule] (proposing to cover CRAs).
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B. Blocking Data Generated by Identity Theft
In 2003, Congress passed FACTA partly as a response to identity
theft.177 One way to read the passage of FACTA is as a referendum on CRA
practices regarding the matter.178 The statute, which was incorporated into
the FCRA, provides a procedure for victims of identity theft that significantly limits the CRAs’ discretion. The new provisions limit the CRAs’ role
in identity theft cases to receiving reports from law enforcement authorities. In addition, the provisions set short, mandatory deadlines for all CRA
actions in identity theft cases.179 The FACTA definition of identity theft,
however, excludes much coerced debt,180 and law enforcement agencies
would be a poor choice for screening coerced debt reports. Thus, my
proposal broadens the current provisions to include coerced debt and
imports a decisionmaker who can more reliably determine the coerced or
fraudulent nature of debt within a family.
The FACTA provisions are a logical place to look for coerced debt remedies, because in many ways, coerced debt is a subtype of identity theft.
Identity theft can be broadly defined as a crime in which one person makes
unauthorized use of another person’s identity, usually for financial gain.181
Coerced debt meets these general criteria. It nevertheless fails to meet
FACTA’s criteria for identity theft, because that crime is seen as one of
fraud committed by strangers.
Although it is inaccessible to many victims of coerced debt, FACTA’s
blocking mechanism appears to be fairly effective, especially when compared with the investigation procedures discussed in the previous subsection. The remedy enables consumers to block fraudulent transactions from
their credit reports.182 This means that future potential creditors would be
unable to see the negative items generated by identity theft. Unlike the

177 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952, 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.) (noting that one of the
Act’s purposes is “to prevent identity theft”).
178 FACTA included six substantive titles, one of which was “Enhancing the Accuracy of
Consumer Report Information.” Id.
179 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006).
180 See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
181 FCRA defines identity theft as “a fraud committed using the identifying information of
another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(3).
182 See id. § 1681c-2(a) (describing how a reporting agency “shall block the reporting of any
information in the file of a consumer that the consumer identifies as information that resulted
from an alleged identity theft” upon the receipt of certain materials).
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FCRA provision for investigating inaccuracies,183 the blocking provision
establishes a default that favors the consumer. Under this FCRA section,
the disputed information is automatically blocked unless the CRA can
verify it within fifteen days, with one fifteen-day extension available if the
CRA needs more information and documentation.184 This default structure
should make the blocking mechanism significantly more accessible to
consumers.
The blocking remedy is relatively new; it did not take effect until December 2004.185 There is virtually no case law186 or academic literature187 on
how well the remedy works. The few anecdotal reports I could compile
suggest that the remedy is far from perfect, although superior to the
investigation process. Christopher Kittell, who blogs under the name
“FCRA Lawyer,” states that many of his clients have either been unaware
of the blocking mechanism or found blocking to be ineffective.188 However,
lawyer Rick Kornis reports that he has found that this provision has worked
for his clients, although he also believes that many unrepresented consumers’ blocking requests fall through the cracks.189 A third lawyer whom I
interviewed has also found the blocking mechanism to be moderately
effective.190
If FACTA’s blocking provision could be broadened to encompass more
coerced debt, it might provide an effective remedy. This potential solution,
however, presents both substantive and procedural challenges that I ultimately address by leveraging the expertise of family courts to inform its
enforcement.
The requirements for accessing the identity-theft block pose two difficulties for victims of coerced debt. The four requirements are “(1) appropriate
183 FRCA’s investigation procedure gives the CRAs a thirty-day deadline to determine
whether disputed information is inaccurate, but does not set a pro-consumer default if the
deadline is not met. Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).
184 16 C.F.R. § 603.3(a)(3)(i)–(ii) (2012).
185 See Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 3(1)–(2), 117 Stat. 1952, 1953 (stating that FACTA would take
effect twelve months after enactment).
186 I was able to find only one case that dealt with 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2, Drew v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, No. 07-00726, 2010 WL 5022466, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2010).
However, in this case, the plaintiff added the § 1681c-2 claim during the middle of the case at the
request of the court, id. at *2, so this opinion provides no lens through which to assess the
effectiveness of the blocking remedy outside the context of litigation.
187 A Westlaw search revealed no law review citations for 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2.
188 Christopher Kittell, 15 U.S.C. 1681c-2, FAIR CREDIT R EPORTING A CT BLOG ( July 11,
2009 9:37 AM), http://fcralawyer.blogspot.com/2009/07/15-usc-1681c-2.html.
189 E-mail from Rick Kornis, Att’y, Kornis & Assocs., P.C., to author (Nov. 14, 2011, 14:33
CST) (on file with author).
190 Telephone Interview with Robert Sola, Att’y (Oct. 27, 2011).
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proof of the identity of the consumer; (2) a copy of an identity theft report;
(3) the identification of [the fraudulent information] by the consumer; and
(4) a statement by the consumer that the information is not information
relating to any transaction by the consumer.”191 The identity theft report
and the consumer statement present barriers for many victims of coerced
debt.
The chief problem with the identity theft report is that it may require
police involvement. The FCRA requires that the report be filed with a law
enforcement agency, “the filing of which subjects the person filing the
report to criminal penalties relating to the filing of false information, if, in
fact, the information in the report is false.”192 Although the statute states
that this law enforcement agency can be the United States Postal Inspection
Service,193 the CRAs have discretion to request additional information,194
and anecdotal evidence suggests that they will often not credit a consumer’s
allegations of identity theft unless the victim files a police report.195
But requiring law enforcement involvement in coerced debt is problematic. Coerced debt exists at the intersection of two crimes, identity theft and
domestic violence, that have a history of victim underreporting and police
neglect. Law enforcement identity theft units are frequently underfunded,196 especially considering that successful identity theft is difficult to
trace and criminal penalties are too low to offset the minimal risk of prosecution.197 In addition, more than half of victims of identity theft never
contact a law enforcement agency about the matter.198 Finally, there is
anecdotal evidence that many police departments will not accept identity
theft reports in which the thief is a family member.199
191
192
193
194
195

15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(1)–(4) (2006).
16 C.F.R. § 603.3(a)(2) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 603.3(a)(3).
See, e.g., Schatten v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 08-0322, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42801, at *6
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2009) (noting that Sallie Mae’s ID Theft Affidavit requires the consumer to
submit a police report).
196 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-766, IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER
AWARENESS AND USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE NEEDED 17-18 (2002).
197 See Identify Theft Surveys and Studies: How Many Identity Theft Victims Are There? What Is
the Impact on Victims?, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/print/
ar/idtheftsurveys.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (reporting on research finding that identity
thieves “have just one in 700 chance of being caught by federal authorities”).
198 See FTC, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT DATA, JANUARY–DECEMBER 2007, at 14 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinelannual-reports/sentinel-cy2007.pdf (finding that 35%-40% of identity theft victims contacted the
police in fiscal years 2005–2007).
199 Interview with Chi Chi Wu, supra note 173.
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The relationship between police and victims of domestic violence has a
difficult history. It took significant advocacy and high-profile litigation for
police departments to take seriously domestic violence,200 and even now, the
effectiveness of police response to domestic violence is controversial.
Mandatory arrest statutes were passed beginning in the 1980s to address the
historical unresponsiveness of police departments to domestic violence, but
these laws have, in turn, raised the concern that they can imperil victim
safety.201 DV victims may not want police assistance for reasons that range
from a distrust of police that stems from their historic nonresponsiveness to
fears that police involvement will anger the abuser and fail to keep the
victim safe.202
The second issue that blocks coerced debt victims from using the FACTA
identity theft procedure is that identity theft is currently defined exclusively as a crime of fraud, not duress. This understanding is codified in the
FACTA requirement that the identity theft victim provide “a statement by
the consumer that the information is not information relating to any
transaction by the consumer.”203 If the victim of coerced debt was forced to
seek a loan under duress or under a combination of fraud and duress, she
will have been personally involved in the transaction and therefore will not
be able to meet this test. Even when the coerced debt was generated exclusively by fraud, authorities may find it less believable that the consumer did
not participate in the transaction when the perpetrator is her spouse or
long-term partner.
Simply rewriting FACTA to include identity theft based on duress,
however, may not solve the problem. Such a standard would raise concerns
about the potential for abuse, especially since the parties’ intimate relationship could suggest collusion.204 The current statutory framework essentially
relies on law enforcement agencies to screen out fraudulent claims of identity theft.205 But given law enforcement authorities’ checkered history with
identity theft and domestic violence, they may not have the institutional
200 See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53 (1992) (describing the growth of court cases requiring police
to enforce DV laws).
201 See, e.g., Jean Ferguson, Professional Discretion and the Use of Restorative Justice Programs in
Appropriate Domestic Violence Cases: An Effective Innovation, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF, no. 2, Summer
2009 at 3, 5 (recounting the history of mandatory arrest laws).
202 See, e.g., STARK, supra note 51, at 63 (stating that, at best, the chances that a batterer will
go to jail as a result of any given incidence of abuse are approximately one in 10,000).
203 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(4) (2006).
204 Collusion is unlikely to occur under my proposal because of the required finding of domestic violence. See infra text accompanying note 235.
205 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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capability to judge cases of coerced debt. That is why my policy proposal
recommends moving this determination to family courts, which have more
relevant expertise. At its most basic, my reform substitutes a divorce
procedure for the criminal procedure as the underlying legal mechanism on
which CRAs must rely in making blocking determinations.
C. Family Courts: A New Decisionmaker
My proposal for addressing the credit-reporting effects of coerced debt
builds on FCRA’s blocking remedy,206 replacing the law enforcement
approach taken by the current statute with a family court approach.207
Because credit reporting is so automated,208 it is important to preserve the
procedural shape of the FCRA process: leveraging a decisionmaker outside
of the credit reporting system whose determination is then mechanically
applied by the CRAs. Under my proposal, a victim of coerced debt who was
obtaining a divorce could request from the family court a ruling determining whether any of the debts that she owed were coerced.
This could be done as part of the division of the family’s property.
While the court is dividing the spouses’ debts and assets, it could also
determine whether the abuser generated any of the debts in the victim’s
name through fraud or duress. The victim could then use this certification
to obtain the identity theft blocking remedy under the FCRA. My proposal
would act as a substitute for the FACTA requirements of an identity theft
report and a statement that the victim did not initiate any of the transactions. The coerced debt block would function as the identity theft block
does now, preventing users of consumer data from viewing records of the
involuntary debt. As discussed in Part III of this Article, the block would
apply to all creditors with respect to debts that were no longer outstanding
and to employers, landlords, and basic utilities with respect to debts that the
victim still owed.
1. The Advantages of Using Family Courts
Using family courts as the certification mechanism for coerced debt produces at least three major advantages. First, court procedures avoid the
identification problems that plague the resolution of identity-theft cases.
206
207

See supra text accompanying note 191.
Alternatively, a proposal could incorporate both law enforcement and family courts,
leaving the law enforcement option available for victims who found it more comfortable or wanted
to avoid the costs of a disputed divorce.
208 See supra subsection II.A.1.
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Second, family courts have substantial expertise in making decisions about
family finances. Third, using family courts is administratively efficient
because, in many cases, they will already be deciding related issues.
With respect to the first point, any procedure designed to address
identity-related crime must develop a means of accurately determining
identity. This is an inherent and difficult problem. Once an identity thief
has substituted her own personal information for that of the victim, it
becomes difficult for the victim to demonstrate that he is the real owner of
that identity—the only way he can do so is by verifying his personal
information, which may be inaccurate as a result of the identity theft.209 In
the case of “traditional” identity theft, victims have been required to
provide substantially more documentation than were those who stole their
identities. Often, victims cannot make this case successfully.210
Even when this specific problem is not present, the question of fraud
may persist. Allegations of financial identity theft invite suspicion, because
the victim is typically trying to avoid obligations in her name. Assertions of
coerced debt are likely to be met with particular skepticism, because the
person the victim will be blaming is her significant other, and it is easy to
imagine two spouses colluding on this issue or the victim benefiting from
the theft. In addition, victims of both traditional identity theft and coerced
debt must prove a negative: that they did not incur a given financial
obligation, although they often have limited access to information that can
209 See Sovern, supra note 132, at 361 (“[C]redit bureaus sometimes change a consumer’s file
to reflect false information submitted by the thief, and so victims attempting to prove their bona
fides are met with the response that their proof does not conform to their existing file.”); see also
James Grimmelmann, Known and Unknown, Property and Contract: Comments on Hoofnagle and
Moringiello, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 85, 88 (2010) (“[Identity theft] victims thus
find themselves trapped in the Kafkaesque position of being unable to prove that they really are
themselves . . . .”). I have first-hand experience with this problem. I had my identity stolen in
March 2012. As part of the theft, the perpetrator changed the telephone number on my credit card
account to her telephone number. When I tried to rectify the situation, the creditor would not
speak to me because I failed its security test by giving the “wrong” telephone number. The
creditor eventually identified me as the real Angela Littwin by matching my voice to the voice in
recordings of earlier conversations I had had with the creditor. It was lucky for me that the
creditor had saved those recordings.
210 See Sovern, supra note 132, at 361 (“The minimal scrutiny given to identity thieves contrasts dramatically with the experiences of those trying to prove that their identity has been
stolen. . . . While applicants for credit need not prove their bona fides, identity theft victims may
be required to submit numerous documents to prove their claims.”); see also Anderson v. Trans
Union, 405 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (summarizing a CRA’s statement that it could “match” a plaintiff
with his credit report even without his social security number); WU & DE ARMOND, supra note
96, § 4.5.2.3 (stating that CRAs will usually decline an investigation request when a consumer fails
to provide a social security number, even though they regularly provide reports to users who do
not do so).
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show that someone else did.211 Because it is the perpetrators who actually
entered into the transactions, they are the ones who received the records,
and the victims often do not have access to them.212
Having a court rule on identity theft can reduce these types of problems. In court, it is relatively easy for a victim of identity theft to show that
he is who he claims to be because it is more difficult to perpetrate a fraud
on a court than on a financial company with which one has little face-to-face
contact. Standard court procedures reduce the risk of impersonation
through processes such as strict verification of identity, the filing of records
under penalty of perjury,213 and in-person appearances. Impersonation
would be particularly difficult in a family court that is handling the parties’
divorce because the parties would already be before the court for other
reasons.
Adjudication can also lower the risk of certification of fraudulent coerceddebt claims and, of equal importance, of the perception that fraudulent
claims are being certified. One of the largest obstacles to achieving recognition for coerced debt is the concern that consumers will use fraudulent
claims of coercion to avoid paying legitimate debts. Using a process as
thorough as adjudication can alleviate this fear. Courts can engage in
extensive fact-finding, which could include subpoenaing financial records
and taking testimony if necessary. A neutral court that has thoroughly
vetted the matter is more likely to arrive at an accurate result than the
parties that currently make decisions about the validity of identity-theft
claims: the CRAs and law enforcement officers.
In addition to the general benefits of courts, family courts in particular
have expertise in adjudicating both financial issues and matters related to
domestic violence, often in the same cases. In determining child support,
alimony, and property distributions, they frequently use complicated
mathematical formulas that incorporate a variety of financial and nonfinancial factors.214
Financial issues abound in divorce. Divorcing spouses and their attorneys often create detailed spreadsheets of the family’s assets and liabilities.215 Child support formulas involve complex calculations in which courts
manipulate financial variables such as “the obligor’s preliminary assessment,”
211
212
213
214
215

See Sovern, supra note 132, at 361.
See supra notes 209-12.
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (requiring unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury).
See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
E.g., VIOLET WOODHOUSE WITH DALE FETHERLING, DIVORCE & MONEY: HOW
TO MAKE THE B EST FINANCIAL DECISIONS DURING DIVORCE, 174-80 (Emily Doskow ed.,
10th ed. 2011).
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“the reduction fraction,” and the “harmonizing factor” used in the American
Law Institute’s (ALI) recommended formula.216 The ALI rubric also
includes specific factors, such as medical and daycare expenses, that are used
in the means test that bankruptcy courts apply.217 In addition, family courts
also engage in the valuation of assets, one of the most challenging tasks
undertaken by financial courts such as bankruptcy courts.218 “[T]he trial
really becomes a battleground over vigorously contested matters dealing
with the worth of the varied marital assets.”219 Family courts must value not
only traditional assets such as family homes, but also more complex assets
like carry-back notes,220 interests in businesses,221 shareholder distributions
from “S” corporations,222 and commercial buildings.223
For purposes of adjudicating matters related to coerced debt, family
courts also have an obvious advantage over other courts with financial
expertise: they have experience adjudicating matters related to domestic
violence.224 And in at least ten states, family courts even have experience
applying judgments about domestic abuse to financial determinations,
usually in property divisions.225
216

The ALI formula reads:
To establish the basic child-support obligation, the child-support formula should determine the dollar amount of the obligor’s preliminary assessment; multiply it by the
reduction fraction to establish a preliminary reduction; multiply the preliminary reduction by the harmonizing factor to establish a final reduction; and then subtract
the final reduction from the preliminary assessment.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
§ 3.05(5) (2002).
217 Compare id. § 3.05(6)–(7) (calculating the amount of child support based on the child’s
educational and medical needs), with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)–(C) (providing a means test to
determine whether a debtor is eligible to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7).
218 See, e.g., Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 959 (1997) (describing the
circuit split over the proper method for valuing consumer assets for “cram down” purposes in
Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
219 BARTH H. GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS § 1.14 (1984).
220 E.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 109 S.W.3d 258, 273-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
221 E.g., Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, No. 2004-T-0097, 2005 WL 2709571, at *1-2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005).
222 E.g., Boone v. Boone, 899 So. 2d 823, 826 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
223 E.g., In re Marriage of Romey, No. 02-1539, 2004 WL 57566, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14,
2004).
224 The laws of every state provide family courts with some jurisdiction over domestic violence. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 210 (2d ed. 2008).
225 Several states consider domestic violence in dividing marital assets. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Crowe, 602 So. 2d 441, 443 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (upholding a lopsided division of property in
part because “the husband physically abused the wife and . . . abused alcohol throughout most of
the children’s childhood [up to the] time of separation”); Comins v. Comins, 595 N.E.2d 804, 805
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A few cases from these states illustrate the ways in which family courts
have made finely tuned judgments in which they balance financial factors
against the severity of the abuse. For example, in one Missouri divorce case,
the court awarded the wife the marital home based on the husband’s twice
putting a loaded gun in her mouth and awarded her a disproportionate share
of the rest of the family’s assets because of his other physical abuse and
infidelity.226 Another example is a case in which a Texas appeals court
upheld an award of 81% of the family’s estate to the wife because of the
husband’s physical abuse, including kicking his wife in front of one of their
children.227 Experience with cases that bridge the financial and the deeply
personal makes the family courts of these states uniquely well suited to rule
on coerced debt. It also suggests that even in the other states’ family courts,
institutional learning about these issues is possible.
Family courts would also be an efficient actor in which to invest authority
to adjudicate matters of coerced debt, because they already make some of

(Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (upholding an uneven property division because of the admitted existence
of abuse and the economic help the wife’s family contributed to the marriage, although the
physical abuse occurred thirty years before the divorce and resulted in relatively minor physical
injuries); Handrahan v. Handrahan, 547 N.E.2d 1141, 1142-43 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that
the wife did not owe the husband 25% of the marital home because “the husband’s drinking, which
was frequent, was wont to degenerate into violence”); Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 5, 10
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (awarding wife a larger share of the marital estate partially due to the
husband’s misconduct, which included numerous extramarital affairs and several instances of
physical abuse); Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 28, 31 (R.I. 1992) (awarding permanent alimony
because husband drank heavily and physically abused his pregnant wife and children); Ohendalski
v. Ohendalski, 203 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. App. 2006) (upholding an award giving wife 81% of the
estate in part because husband had engaged in physical abuse); Awad v. Rasmussen-Awad, No. 1402-01142, 2004 WL 744234, at *7 (Tex. App. Apr. 8, 2004) (approving unequal division to wife,
where she “had health problems both before and after the parties separated—some, such as anxiety
and emotional problems, due all or in part to” husband’s physical abuse). The District of
Columbia also considers the economic effects of abuse when marital property is being distributed.
See, e.g., Burwell v. Burwell, 700 A.2d 219, 224-25 (D.C. 1997) (overturning a district court’s
decision for failure to consider the effects of the husband’s abuse and manipulation in worsening
the couple’s economic health, despite presumption of equitable distribution in divorce). However,
a minority of states will consider domestic abuse only when it is extreme. See, e.g., Stover v.
Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Ark. 1985) (allowing consideration of the fact that the wife had
been convicted of conspiracy to kill her husband to affect property division, but cautioning that
the facts of the case before them were “bizarre”); In re Marriage of Sommers, 792 P.2d 1005, 1010
(Kan. 1990) (declining to consider marital fault except in extreme cases, “where a party’s conduct
is so gross and extreme that failure to penalize therefor would, itself, be inequitable”); McDougal
v. McDougal, 545 N.W.2d 357, 361 n.7 (Mich. 1996) (disallowing the element of fault in the
distribution of assets because husband’s behavior was not “outrageous”); Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472
N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (upholding an unequal distribution of assets where the husband
stabbed the wife multiple times without provocation and was convicted of attempted murder).
226 Dodson, 904 S.W.2d at 5, 9-10.
227 Ohendalski, 203 S.W.3d at 914.
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the findings necessary to coerced debt determinations. In divorces in which
the distribution of property is at issue, courts already compile detailed lists
of the parties’ debts.228 In cases in which there are restraining orders or in
which child custody is an issue, courts already make determinations about
domestic violence.229 In states that consider domestic violence in property
distributions, courts already generate the precise findings necessary to rule
on whether a debt was coerced. The only differences between this type of
property distribution and my proposals are that, under court direction, the
criteria would be more explicit and the rulings would have the ability to
affect credit reports.
One problem with the framework I just presented is that some states
and localities have separate, cheaper provisions for simple divorces that do
not involve property divisions,230 so many victims of coerced debt could be
obtaining their divorces without receiving a formal property division. This
would disproportionately affect lower-income families because they are less
likely to be able to afford the more expensive forms of divorce. However,
even when the divorce does not include a property distribution, family
courts may still be making factual findings about domestic violence. And
even in simple divorces, the courts may have relevant expertise from
adjudicating similar cases, which creates some administrative savings.
Certainly, using family courts is more efficient than having CRAs hire
additional decisionmakers and train them in domestic violence issues or
than training law enforcement officers to understand the complex financial
arrangements involved in coerced debt.
2. The Test for Coerced Debt
The precise contours of a test for coerced debt will undoubtedly need
refining as more empirical work on the subject is conducted, but the
outlines can be sketched now. There would be two major elements to the
test: a pattern of domestic abuse and control as well as a finding that each
debt was not generated voluntarily.
The finding of domestic violence can borrow from or incorporate existing state law. Every state already has a definition of domestic abuse in its
228
229

See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d) (West 2008) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that an abuser will not receive custody of or access to any children).
230 See, e.g., SELF-HELP DIVORCE INFORMATION, WAKE COUNTY C LERK CT., available
at http://web.co.wake.nc.us/courts/documents/Divorce_Packet.pdf (providing for a $167 uncontested divorce in Wake County, North Carolina, in which there is no consideration of property
divisions, alimony, or fault).
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code, usually for the purpose of granting protective orders and making
child-custody determinations.231 The FCRA should incorporate state
definitions of domestic violence used in deciding issues whose factual
underpinnings span the course of the marriage. Because pervasive control is
the foundation of coerced debt,232 it is important that the abuse be a longterm issue. The key is identifying a pattern of coercive behavior that prevented the victim from exercising free will with respect to financial matters.
For states that already incorporate domestic violence into property distribution laws, the definitions of abuse in these laws are the logical place to
begin. For other states, child custody rules might be an appropriate source
of law, because custody determinations are based on a long-term range of
conduct.233 Further empirical research is needed to determine whether relief
should be restricted to cases in which the abuse has a physical component,
including threats, or whether to use a broader definition of domestic abuse.
In the meantime, existing state law on domestic violence provides a starting
point that would legitimize coerced debt determinations.
The separate finding of domestic violence is necessary because it provides crucial context for the court. The underlying climate of fear and
control in an abusive relationship is what enables coerced debt,234 and a
background understanding of this pattern is essential for evaluating coercion
claims about specific debts. A finding of domestic violence can prevent both
the false positives and false negatives that might occur if each debt were
judged without reference to the overall tenor of the relationship. It helps
reduce false positives by decreasing the likelihood that parties will bring
claims of coerced debt in cases in which particular credit transactions might
look suspicious out of context, but in which there is no history of coercion.
It may also discourage nonabusive spouses from colluding in order to obtain
a determination of coerced debt. A finding of domestic violence on one’s
231 See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 854 (2012) (listing purposes for which
courts may consider abuse); see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)( j) (2012) (setting up a
rebuttable statutory presumption against child custody for a parent who has engaged in domestic
abuse); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (stating that in any action concerning custody or visitation rights, “court[s] must consider the effect of [any proven] domestic
violence upon the best interests of the child”); FAM. § 153.004(c), (e) (directing courts to
“consider the commission of family violence in determining whether to deny, restrict, or limit the
possession of a child by a parent” and not to allow unsupervised visitation with parents whose
behavior exhibits a “pattern of past or present child neglect or physical or sexual abuse by that
parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child”).
232 Littwin, supra note 1, at 973.
233 Cf. DOM. REL. § 240 (requiring courts, when considering the effects of domestic violence on the best interests of the child, also to consider “other facts and circumstances as the court
deems relevant”).
234 Littwin, supra note 1, at 982.
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legal record seems like an unacceptable price for helping one’s ex-spouse
block certain debts from her credit report.235 Conversely, requiring an initial
determination of domestic violence can help victims of coerced debt make
their case. A finding that a given relationship is steeped in coercion can
enable courts to see the menace behind transactions that might otherwise
appear innocent.
The second element of the test would be a determination about whether
the victim entered a given transaction voluntarily. In practice, this decision
would probably require analyzing whether the victim entered the transaction through fraud or duress. Factual questions to consider might include
whether the victim was aware of the transaction as it was taking place;
whether it was, in fact, the abuser who completed the credit application or
made the relevant purchases; whether the abuser hid information about the
transaction from the victim; whether the victim, upon discovery of a
fraudulent transaction, felt safe asking the abuser about it; whether the
abuser threatened the victim in connection with the transaction; and
whether the transaction was conducted in coercive circumstances, such as
after a physical assault. Judicial findings about who benefited from any
purchases would also inform this analysis. For example, a purchase of
household goods would be less likely to be coerced than a purchase of items
related to an abuser’s extramarital affair.
It is important to include debt generated by fraud as well as duress in
the definition of coerced debt because in an abusive relationship, the
dynamics of coercion can be a critical factor in enabling fraud. In my
preliminary study of coerced debt, advocates reported that abusers engaged
in a range of behaviors that prevented victims from discovering fraudulent
debt or from taking action upon discovery. These behaviors included
restricting victim’s access to the family’s mail;236 putting the victim on an
allowance so that she had no direct interaction with the family’s finances;237
235 One way to further discourage collusion would be to have the coerced debt appear as a
negative item on the abuser’s credit report. I would be concerned, however, that this approach
would move too far in the opposite direction by dramatically increasing an abuser’s resistance to
motions for certifying coerced debt. In addition, under my proposal, the abuser whose record was
tarred would not benefit from the finding of coerced debt. This characteristic distinguishes the
risk of collusion under my proposal from historical collusion between spouses seeking divorces in
fault-only jurisdictions. In those cases, both spouses received the benefit of obtaining a divorce.
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86
VA. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2000) (noting that historically in fault-only jurisdictions, spouses wishing
to divorce would collude to have one party file a sham lawsuit alleging statutory violations to
obtain a divorce decree from the court).
236 Littwin, supra note 1, at 998.
237 Id. at 983-84.
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forbidding the victim from asking about financial matters;238 and having the
victim sign documents with no opportunity to read them.239 All of these
actions rely on duress, but enable the abuser to engage in fraud.
The voluntariness test would apply to each debt separately. If a victim
alleged duress or fraud in a number of debts, the court could make a
positive finding for some and a negative finding for others. In many cases, a
debt may be partially coerced. This is especially likely for credit card debt,
which is usually composed of multiple transactions made over an extended
period of time.240 Dividing such debts could quickly become complicated,
because when a credit card loan is in default, much of the balance is composed of fees and interest unrelated to specific transactions.241 Unfortunately, it may not be possible for courts to label debts as partially coerced,
because my proposal relies on blocking the existence of each debt on credit
reports, and a debt cannot be partially blocked. The best a court could do in
such circumstances would be to reduce the reported balance to the extent
that the debt was coerced. Alternatively, if this process became unworkable,
courts could block any debt that they determined was more than 50%
coerced. In such cases, courts should look at the balance of the transactions
with a special emphasis on how the credit card was obtained.
After determining that one or more debts were, in fact, coerced, the
court would issue a certification of coercion that would list the relevant
debts. The victim could then submit this certification to the CRAs, where it
would have one of two effects described in Part III, depending on the
repayment status of the debt.
3. Implementation
My proposal could be implemented by amending the FCRA to provide
an additional means of obtaining the blocking remedy discussed in Section
II.B.242 Alternatively, the ECOA already has one regulation that can be
read to disallow the consideration of coerced debt in lending decisions,243
and this provision could be expanded to make its protections clearer and
238
239
240

Id. at 985-86.
Id. at 990.
Cf. Mann, supra note 39, at 384 (noting that transaction-based issuers of credit cards
profit from customers with a high volume of transactions).
241 See id. at 386 (“[T]he decision to carry a balance [on a credit card] leads immediately to
interest charges on the cardholder’s account, which accrue at a [high] rate. . . . Moreover, once the
borrower begins to carry a balance, the likelihood of late and over-limit fees can increase
substantially.”).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 177-205.
243 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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more user-friendly. In both cases, the certifications of coerced debt generated
by state family courts would become evidence submitted to the CRAs to
block coerced debts in accordance with my proposal.
a. Alternative Implementation Through the ECOA
Instead of amending the FCRA’s blocking provision, it would also be
possible to implement my policy proposal through the ECOA.244 The
advantage to using the ECOA is that the changes could take place at the
regulatory, rather than the statutory, level. ECOA regulatory authority has
always been broad,245 and under the Dodd-Frank Act, power to implement
the statute was transferred from the Federal Reserve to the CFPB.246 This
transfer allows the CFPB to implement this part of my proposal on its own,
without waiting for Congress. As discussed above, the CFPB has already
strongly signaled its intent to regulate the credit reporting industry.247
There is already an ECOA regulation that can be read to require creditors to exclude coerced debt from their consideration of an applicant’s credit
history. The provision currently requires creditors to consider, “[o]n the
applicant’s request, any information the applicant may present that tends to
indicate the credit history being considered by the creditor does not accurately reflect the applicant’s creditworthiness.”248
Research revealed only one written judicial opinion interpreting this
provision, and the court’s opinion in that case suggests that the provision’s
scope is fairly broad.249 In that case, the consumer-plaintiff was trying to
exclude from consideration some bankruptcy-related credit history that
should not have been included in the creditor’s assessment of her creditworthiness.250 Interestingly, the creditor-defendant argued that the provision applied only to “problems arising in connection with joint accounts
with a spouse or former spouse,” because it appeared in a subsection with
two regulations addressing spousal credit issues.251 The court rejected the
244
245

15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006).
See id. § 1691b(a) (directing the regulatory body to “prescribe regulations . . . as in the
judgment of the Bureau are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter
[Equal Credit Opportunity], to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate or
substantiate compliance therewith”).
246 Id. § 1691b.
247 See CFPB Proposed Rule, supra note 176.
248 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(ii) (2012).
249 See Jones v. Keycorp Bank, No. 07-12383, 2008 WL 324126, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6,
2008) (holding that the regulation was meant to allow applicants to correct any information in a
faulty credit report, not only misinformation for joint accounts).
250 Id. at *1.
251 Id. at *2.
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creditor’s argument, citing the plain language of the provision.252 The
creditor’s argument that the regulation covered only spousal debts suggests
that applying it to these debts would be relatively uncontroversial.
This regulation would, however, be significantly more effective for
coerced-debt cases if it were to explicitly cover coerced debt. Much like my
proposed blocking mechanism under the FCRA, the regulation could be
changed to state that a certification of coerced debt by a family court
requires the exclusion of that debt from credit-granting decisions. The
regulation could then provide guidelines for family courts, and the CFPB
could promulgate forms to be used in the certification process.
The regulation could also be strengthened by deleting the phrase “on
the applicant’s request.”253 Because the ECOA covers creditors rather than
CRAs, only rules that apply in all circumstances become incorporated into
CRA practice. For example, the CRAs currently do not report race or
marital status,254 because the ECOA bans creditors from ever considering
these factors.255 If the regulation prohibited creditors from considering
coerced debt in all cases—rather than only when consumers protested its
inclusion—the CRA reports would exclude this information. This would
thus enable consumers to contact the CRAs about coerced debt instead of
having to approach each potential creditor individually.
The ECOA regulations are due for an update. The statute and its regulations contain anachronisms, such as one provision addressing the status of
consumers who do not have telephones in their homes256 and another on the
effects of usury laws.257 More importantly, the ECOA does not take into
account the changing nature of credit discrimination, of which the advent of
coerced debt is one part. The ECOA was passed in 1974258 to prevent

252 Id. The court ultimately granted the creditor’s motion to dismiss on other unrelated
grounds. Id. at *3.
253 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(ii).
254 See, e.g., Information Factored in Score, EQUIFAX (May 31, 2012, 3:03 PM), https://help.
equifax.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/138/~/information-factored-in-score (listing “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or marital status” as factors not considered in calculating a credit score).
255 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2006).
256 See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4) (“A creditor shall not take into account whether there is a
telephone listing in the name of an applicant for consumer credit but may take into account
whether there is a telephone in the applicant’s residence.”).
257 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(d) (“When each party to a marriage separately and voluntarily
applies for and obtains separate credit accounts with the same creditor, those accounts shall not be
aggregated or otherwise combined for purposes of determining permissible finance charges or
permissible loan ceilings under the laws of any State or of the United States.”).
258 Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974).
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lenders from discriminating against women.259 The 1970s were a time of
consumer credit scarcity,260 and before the ECOA, many women had been
unable to obtain credit in their own names.261 Accordingly, the ECOA
focused on issues like ending discriminatory denials of credit and helping
women build their credit histories.
The case for updating the ECOA’s regulations becomes even clearer
upon closer examination of the provision that immediately precedes the one
discussed above. Under this regulation, creditors are required to include
spousal authorized user transactions in their credit determinations.262 This
means that when Spouse A is an authorized user on Spouse B’s credit
account, any transactions associated with the account become part of Spouse
A’s credit report, even though Spouse B is the only person liable for any
resulting debt.263 This provision applies only to spousal credit accounts. It
was designed as a prophylactic measure to bolster the credit reports of
married women.264
But since the 1970s, consumer lending has undergone a massive transformation.265 Credit is widely available,266 and excluding negative credit
transactions from one’s credit report has become as important as incorporating positive transactions. It is difficult to imagine today’s lenders engaging
in the type of per se gender discrimination that took place before the
ECOA. Any different treatment that remains is likely to be an effect of

259 See, e.g., Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The purpose
of the ECOA is to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married
women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual credit.”). The ECOA was
amended in 1976 to include race, ethnicity, age, and other prohibited classifications. Equal Credit
Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251.
260 For a history of the rapid expansion of consumer lending in the late twentieth century,
see David A. Moss and Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution,
or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 327-46 (1999).
261 See, e.g., Anderson, 666 F.2d at 1277.
262 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(i) (2012).
263 See, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2004) (requiring creditors to conduct a reasonable investigation into whether the ex-husband’s credit account was
factored into the wife’s credit report); Alabran v. Capital One Bank, No. 04-935, 2005 WL
3338663, at *8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005) (holding that although plaintiff was an authorized user on
the spouse’s account, he was not responsible for the debt of the account).
264 See, e.g., GREGORY M. TRAVALIO, ANDERSON’S OHIO CONSUMER LAW MANUAL § 12.10
(MB rev. ed. 2012) (explaining in brief the history of this section of the ECOA regulations).
265 See supra note 260.
266 See, e.g., John Kiernan, Card Hub’s 6 Credit Predictions for 2012, CARD HUB (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.cardhub.com/edu/credit-predictions (“As we all know, available credit withered during
the Great Recession but has since bounced back.”).
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negative credit-scoring events that disproportionately affect women, and
coerced debt may be such an event.267
Today, the authorized user provision may be exacerbating the effects of
coerced debt. In a time when credit may be too easy to obtain—especially in
someone else’s name—the regulation may be inclusive to a fault, because it
mandates the credit reporting of an account over which the authorized user
has no control. In an authorized use account, only the debtor receives and
pays billing statements. If the debtor spouse is uncooperative, it is difficult
for the authorized user spouse to obtain information about account balances
and to make payments. When coerced debt is involved, the authorized user
situation can quickly become untenable. Even if the victim knows or finds
out about the account, she will be unable to close the account and may have
difficulty making payments, because she will not be the debtor. She may be
able to have her name removed as an authorized user, but some of the
professionals I interviewed for the coerced debt study said that even this
could be difficult.268
An update of the ECOA regulations is needed to bring them into
alignment with the realities of today’s credit market. The authorized user
regulation should be amended to make the exclusion of authorized use data
the default, although it could provide an exception for consumers who can
show that certain authorized use information is relevant. In addition, the
provision that allows for the exclusion of certain negative credit data should
be amended to apply broadly and to include coerced debt.
b. State Court Enforcement
My proposal may raise federalism concerns in that it involves the federal
government directing state governments to take certain actions. However,
it likely falls on the permissible side of the anticommandeering line drawn
by the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States269 and New York v. United
States,270 because it applies to state judicial officers rather than to executive
or legislative officers. In Printz and New York, the Court held that the
federal government cannot compel the actions of the states’ executive and
legislative branches, respectively. The Printz Court specifically distinguished
267 See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 1, at 978-81 (arguing that the phenomenon underlying coerced
debt—coercive control—is gendered).
268 Telephone Interview with Laura Russell, Supervising Att’y, Legal Aid Soc’y (Sep. 15, 2011).
269 See 521 U.S. 898, 907-09 (1997) (explaining the difference, in constitutional terms, between commandeering state judges and commandeering state executive or legislative officers).
270 See 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992) (explaining that federal “direction” of state judges is
“mandated” by the Supremacy Clause).
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state executive officers from state judicial officers, finding that the existence
of historical evidence that the early federal government compelled state
judicial officers to enforce federal law did not mean that state executive
officers could be similarly bound.271
Nonetheless, my proposal might be considered more intrusive than the
pricing statute at issue in Testa v. Katt, the case on which the Printz Court
relied for the principle that state courts must enforce federal law.272 Testa
addressed the relatively simple situation of a federal statute that could be
enforced in either state or federal court.273 In contrast, my reform would be
implemented as part of a proceeding that is entirely a creature of state law.
It thus might be perceived as an attempt to augment state family codes.
This would be especially true if the reform incorporated state law definitions of domestic abuse. On the other hand, my proposal would not change
the rights or duties of any parties to a divorce; its only effect would be on
credit reporting, which is governed by federal law.
Alternatively, even if the federal government could not require state
courts to implement my policy, it could still enable them to do so, either on
the courts’ own initiative or as directed by supplemental state statutes or
judicial rules. The federal statute or regulation could use conditional
language stating that if a state family court makes a finding of coerced debt,
that finding would be binding on the CRAs.
Federal law could be supplemented with efforts to amend state statutes
or judicial rules and to lobby state judicial organizations that disseminate
best practices information to courts. Another way to increase state court use
of the certification option would be to target the domestic violence trainings
that many states require for their judiciaries.274 In some states, divorcing

271 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (“These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was
originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power.
That assumption was perhaps implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution, and was
explicit in another. . . . It is understandable why courts should have been viewed distinctively in
this regard; unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the
time.”).
272 See id. at 928-29 (“Testa stands for the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply
federal law . . . .”).
273 See 330 U.S. 386, 387 (1947) (“[The statute] provides that federal district courts shall have
jurisdiction of such suits ‘concurrently with State and Territorial courts.’”).
274 See, e.g., ROBERT A. FALL, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE JUDICIAL E DUCATION —COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM 12, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/Components%20of%20an%20Effective%20Prgrm%20
for%20DV%20Judicial%20Education.pdf (describing New Jersey’s judicial education program on
domestic violence).
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parties are already required to submit financial disclosure forms; these could
be modified to encompass coerced debt.275
In either the mandatory or the optional scenario, the CFPB, which now
has jurisdiction over the FCRA and the ECOA, could promulgate a form
for family courts to use. Family court practice already relies heavily on
forms and language from standardized templates,276 so it would not be
burdensome for divorcing parties to submit such forms to the court or for
courts to sign off on them. The use of forms has the additional advantage
that they could be incorporated into the books and web sites used by family
court mediators and pro se parties,277 thus enabling coerced debt certification to take place even in divorces with no judicial hearings or legal representation.
III. BLOCKING COERCED DEBT
This Part addresses the legal effects of the coerced debt certification
proposed in Part II. Because my proposal alters only the reporting of
coerced debt, not the consumer’s liability for it, I have separated my
reforms into two sub-proposals: one for debt that is already no longer
legally binding and one for debt that is still outstanding. Creditors have
different reasons for valuing information about these two types of debt.
Data on past debt are useful only for their predictive power, while data
about outstanding debt also provide creditors with information about a
consumer’s current and future available funds. The “predictive interest” can
be preserved when blocking coerced debt from a credit report, but the
“current liabilities” interest cannot.
There is a crucial difference between the FCRA’s identity-theft blocking
mechanism and my proposal: the treatment of liability. The FCRA is supplemented by other federal statutes that alter legal responsibility for fraudulent
debt. While a consumer is seeking to block a fraudulent debt under the
FCRA, she may also be seeking to discharge her liability for it under
another federal statute. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) limit the amount for which consumers

275 E.g., FORM FL-155, CAL. CTS. (2004), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
fl155.pdf.
276 See, e.g., TX Family Law Premium LexisNexis Forms, LEXISNEXIS, http://w3.nexis.com/
sources/scripts/info.pl?FRAMES=Data&301121&GCC=true (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“With
more than 1,600 family law forms online, TX Family Law Premium LexisNexis Forms contains a
comprehensive collection of forms for family law practice in Texas . . . .”).
277 E.g., JOHN VENTURA & MARY R EED, DIVORCE FOR DUMMIES (3d ed. 2009).
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can be held liable for fraudulent use of their credit and debit cards.278
Policymakers appear to expect consumers to simultaneously seek protection
under the FCRA and these unauthorized use provisions. For example, the
FTC provides a single identity theft affidavit that solicits information
consumers need to meet the requirements for both statutory regimes.279
This overlap means that a debt blocked under the FCRA is also likely to
be invalidated under the TILA or the EFTA, which is important for future
potential creditors of consumers. Otherwise, a consumer’s legal liability
could exceed the liabilities listed on her credit report, which would compromise the current liabilities interest of potential creditors. Even under the
current system, there is some risk of this problem. A consumer might not
pursue or attain the unauthorized use remedies in addition to the FCRA
block. But the risk is significantly greater when there is no liability relief
provision available. Thus, I propose a complete coerced debt block on past
liabilities but a narrower block for debts a consumer still owes.
A. The Predictive Power of Past Debt
The first effect of submitting a certification of coerced debt to the CRAs
would be to block from the consumer’s credit report all coerced debts she no
longer owed. These debts present a relatively easy case. Blocking them does
not mislead creditors about the extent of a consumer’s current indebtedness,
and the coerced nature of the debts means that their initial accumulation
does not accurately reflect a consumer’s risk profile.
Records of past obligations are important for their predictive power.
The idea is that consumers maintain consistent approaches to debt payment
such that payment history will be relevant to future payment behavior.280
These data enable creditors to answer questions about consumer behavioral
tendencies—such as promptness and willingness to make payments under a
278 See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006) (limiting consumer liability for
unauthorized credit card charges to fifty dollars); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693g(a) (2006) (limiting consumer liability for unauthorized debit card charges to fifty dollars
or the money used before the financial institution had constructive notice, whichever is less).
279 See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM’S COMPLAINT AND AFFIDAVIT, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/resources/forms/affidavit.pdf (“A voluntary form for filing a report
with law enforcement, and disputes with credit reporting agencies and creditors about identify
theft-related problems.”). The affidavit contains three “declarations,” which consumers can
confirm or disaffirm. Id. One of the declarations (whether the consumer is willing to work with
law enforcement) targets an FCRA requirement in 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(2). A second (whether
the consumer authorized the transactions) targets various provisions of the FCRA and TILA. The
third (whether the consumer derived any benefit from the transaction) addresses a TILA
unauthorized use provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o).
280 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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variety of financial circumstances—that would be otherwise difficult to
determine. But when a debt is incurred involuntarily, a consumer’s payment
history is less likely to be representative. This is especially true when the
consumer was not even aware of the debt’s existence.
1. Treatment of Past Debt Under My Proposal
In many cases, by the time a victim learns of a coerced debt, it may have
been paid off already or rendered uncollectable for other reasons, such as
bankruptcy or the expiration of the statute of limitations. But if such a debt
were ever delinquent, it would still have a significant negative impact on
the victim’s credit rating. Although the CRAs do not release the precise
details of their credit scoring algorithms,281 FICO, which claims to promulgate the most commonly used formula,282 publishes a list of the factors it
considers. Under the FICO model, payment history is the most important
variable, counting for 35% of a score.283 Payment history is even weighted
more heavily than a consumer’s current amount owed, which comprises 30%
of the score.284 So blocking past coerced debt could significantly improve
victims’ credit scores.
Excluding coerced debt that is no longer outstanding should not have a
major negative effect on future creditors, because the purpose of including
past debt on a credit report is predictive.285 The usefulness of one’s payment history is predicated on the belief that consumers’ track records are
predictive of their future payment behavior.286 But in the case of a victim of
coerced debt who has divorced her abuser, this inference may no longer be
justified. A court of law will have determined that the victim did not
voluntarily create the debt, so its existence should have less predictive
value. The payment history on coerced debts may very well reflect the
abuser’s willingness and ability to make prompt payments, not the victim’s.
The exact relationship between past coerced debt and victims’ future
payment tendencies is an empirical question that will require further
research,287 but it is still useful to think through some of the plausible
281
282

See supra text accompanying note 27.
See How Credit Scoring Helps Me, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/
scoringhelps.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“Credit scores—especially FICO® scores, the most
widely used credit bureau scores—have made big improvements in the credit process.”).
283 What’s in my FICO Score, supra note 28.
284 Id.
285 Thus, any cost-of-credit concerns about my proposal are likely to have limited applicability.
286 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
287 Answering this question would require a large, controlled study comparing the credit
histories of past victims of coerced debt with those of the general population. The feasibility of
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scenarios now. In situations in which the victim was not aware of the
coerced debt, the payment history (or lack thereof) will be entirely attributable to the abuser. In circumstances in which the victim knew of the debt
but incurred it under duress, her ability to make payments could easily be
compromised and thus not reflect her payment tendencies under noncoercive
conditions. Even when the victim is able to make payments without
interference, one can imagine that she might prioritize “her” debts over
those generated by the abuser.
The above points examine the predictive potential of past coerced debt
on the payment of future voluntary debt, but my proposal also implicates
questions about the effect of past coerced debt on the likelihood of future
coerced debt, generated either by the current abuser or a future abusive
partner. In the case of the current abuser, the primary argument would be
that victims of domestic violence may return to the abuser multiple times
before leaving for good.288 This would give the abuser additional opportunities to incur coerced debt in the victim’s name. However, in order to access
the coerced debt–blocking remedy, a victim must be in the process of
divorcing her abuser, a step that is indicative of a permanent break in the
relationship. There are never any guarantees that a given relationship—
abusive or not—is fully terminated, but divorce is a generally accepted end
point. In addition, a divorce may represent a victim’s best chance of establishing herself as an independent financial unit.289 Though there may be
plausible concerns that even a former abusive partner could generate
coerced debt, for example, by applying pressure via stalking or by using
such a study is undermined by the fact that consumers can obtain only their current credit reports,
not past credit reports. Time-series credit report data would be essential to tracking consumer
payment histories over time. In general, too little is known about the extent of credit scores’
predictive power because the CRAs refuse to release their scoring formulas. It seems reasonable to
speculate that the predictive power of credit scores is generally high because CRAs have strong
incentives to meet creditors’ needs, and creditors want predictive scores. But it is difficult for
policymakers to evaluate proposals to include or exclude different types of information—such as
coerced debt—from credit reports when researchers outside the CRA industry cannot measure the
predictive value of various types of data.
288 For example, there is a widely referenced statistic that DV victims attempt to leave abusive relationships an average of seven times before succeeding. See, e.g., CASCADE CTRS., INC.,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2, available at http://www.wellness.uci.edu/domesticviolence.pdf; Julie
Baumgardner, Domestic Violence, FIRST THINGS FIRST, http://firstthings.org/domestic-violence
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012); Information on Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC ABUSE SHELTER OF
THE FLA. KEYS, http://www.domesticabuseshelter.org/InfoDomesticViolence.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012). I was not, however, able to identify any scholarly research either supporting or
refuting this claim.
289 However, much more work is needed on this topic. See generally Michael A. Anderson et
al., “Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?”: A Descriptive Study of Victim Reported Impediments to Her Safety, 18
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 155 (2003).
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personal identification information acquired during marriage, the policy
considerations discussed below still militate in favor of blocking coerced debt.
With respect to concerns about potential future abusive partners, the
vast majority of DV survivors are not repeat victims. The most recent,
major national survey of domestic violence found that, among female
respondents who had experienced domestic violence, 70.8% had had only
one abusive partner over the course of their lifetimes.290 Thus, fewer than
30% of DV survivors are victimized by future partners. In comparison, the
same study found that 35.6% of females in the general U.S. population had
experienced domestic violence at some point during their lives.291 Therefore, past domestic violence does not appear to be correlated with future
domestic violence by new partners, and because my definition of coerced
debt depends on a finding of domestic violence, past victims of coerced debt
are equally unlikely to be future victims of coerced debt at the hands of a
new partner.
Finally, even if there are some situations in which past coerced debt
predicts future coerced debt, that does not necessarily mean that creditors
should have access to this information. Federal law already prohibits credit
discrimination on the basis of several classifications that would probably
improve the predictive power of credit-scoring formulas, and DV status is a
particularly important classification to protect. The ECOA prohibits many
forms of credit discrimination. It was originally passed in 1974 to address an
issue related to the topic of this Article, lending discrimination on the basis
of gender and marital status.292 The statute and its regulations have since
been broadened to cover additional classifications such as race, religion, and
age.293
Many of these characteristics are statistically significant in predicting
creditworthiness. The regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve state
that even statistically sound formulas cannot be used if they negatively
impact certain groups. For example, creditors may not include age as a
variable if a credit-scoring formula has a negative impact on elderly consumers, but may use it if senior citizens are affected positively.294 The
290 MICHELE C. B LACK ET AL, NAT’L C TR. FOR I NJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 48 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_executive_summary-a.pdf.
291 Id. at 39.
292 See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
293 See supra note 259.
294 See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(ii) (2012) (“[A] creditor may use an applicant’s age as a predictive variable provided that the age of an elderly applicant is not assigned a negative factor or
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regulations also specifically prohibit using aggregate statistics about child
bearing in evaluating creditworthiness.295 The modern reader may be
startled to learn that questions regarding birth control were common on
pre-ECOA loan applications,296 but from a statistical perspective, this
practice may have been surprisingly sound. Empirical bankruptcy research
since that time has suggested that there may be a correlation between
supporting children and financial distress.297
Even the very classification that motivated the original passage of the
ECOA is not exempt. A contemporary study analyzed data from several
creditors’ applicant pools and found that including marital status in creditscoring models did improve their accuracy.298 Use of this classification was
restricted nonetheless. On this issue, regulators have had to walk a particularly fine line in weighing antidiscrimination goals against lenders’ data
needs. On the one hand, one major purpose of the law was to change the
creditor practice of differentiating among women of different marital
statuses.299 On the other hand, state marriage law does impact creditors’
collection rights, and the ECOA preserves access to certain marital information.300
In general, this is an area of law that requires careful balancing of the
benefits of more accurate credit scoring with the harms caused by mathematically penalizing certain groups whose access to credit policymakers want to
ensure. These two interests conflict frequently, and in many cases, policymakers have chosen discrimination prevention. If there is in fact a relationship between past coerced debt and credit risk, victims of domestic violence
value.”); id. § 202.6(b)(2)(iv) (“In any system of evaluating creditworthiness, a creditor may consider the age of an elderly applicant when such age is used to favor the elderly applicant in
extending credit.”).
295 Id. § 202.6(b)(3).
296 See Susan Smith Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Effects, 1981
WIS. L. REV. 655, 659-60 (discussing a Senate report naming creditors’ requests for information
about birth control use as one of thirteen common types of credit discrimination based on sex and
marital status).
297 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2002) (finding
that “[t]he presence of children in a household—with nothing more—increases the likelihood that
the household will be in bankruptcy by three-fold”).
298 James F. Smith, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost/Benefit Analysis, 32 J.
FIN. 609, 618 (1977).
299 The National Commission on Consumer Finance made findings about the barriers that
single and married women faced in obtaining credit that were influential in the ECOA’s passage.
See id. at 609 (“The public record on the issue of the availability of credit to women, which led to
the Act, goes back to hearings held by the National Commission on Consumer Finance on May
22-23, 1972.”).
300 For example, creditors may ask about an applicant’s spouse or former spouse when the
applicant lives in a community-property state. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2)(iv).
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would have a particularly strong claim to this kind of discrimination
protection. The moment of leaving an abusive relationship is critical; it determines whether victims and their children can establish independent households apart from the abuser. Access to the mainstream of American
financial life, through credit, employment, and housing, is crucial to their
success.
2. Determining What Debt Is Past
An important component of a system that separates past and present
debt is the process for determining whether a debt is still collectable.
Despite their poor performance in maintaining consumer credit files
generally, the CRAs are the logical entities to make this classification. They
have the best access to the relevant information, and indeed already provide
much of it on current credit reports. The main statutory amendments
needed on this point would be those designed to ensure that the CRAs
labeled debts correctly.
There are three main ways in which a consumer ceases to be liable for a
debt: payment in full, bankruptcy, or other legal defenses to collection.
CRAs already report full payment and account closures on credit reports.301
It would be administratively simple for CRAs to block any certified coerced
debt that would have otherwise been listed as paid.
As for bankruptcies, the CRAs have procedures for being notified of
them.302 It should also be simple for CRAs to determine which debts were
discharged by a bankruptcy, to block those debts when they were coerced,
and to list the bankruptcy on the consumer’s report instead. However, the
CRAs do not have a good track record here. They frequently report debts
discharged by bankruptcy as currently outstanding.303
Debts that are uncollectable for other reasons present the most difficult
case. This category consists of debts such as those for which the statute of
limitations has run or which a court has found invalid. When a court of law
has ruled on a debt, the CRAs should receive notification through their
existing procedures for downloading public records, although there is some
anecdotal evidence that even this type of court record is sometimes not
301 CRAs are required to report a consumer’s voluntary closure of an account. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681c(e) (2006).
302 See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.3.2.5.1 (discussing CRA procedures for obtaining public records).
303 See, e.g., In re Sommersdorf, 139 B.R. 700, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (“Such a notation
on a credit report is, in fact, just the type of creditor shenanigans intended to be prohibited by the
automatic stay.”).
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enough to trump a furnisher’s continued reporting of a debt.304 The statute
of limitations scenario is trickier, because the CRAs currently have no
system for tracking these expirations. The CRAs are in fact allowed to
report all debts for a period of seven years,305 and the law makes no exception
for limitations running.306 This makes sense, because expired debts are still
useful as evidence of payment history even after they cease to be relevant to
the question of current indebtedness. Requiring the CRAs to track this
information might be burdensome because limitations periods vary widely
from state to state.307
To facilitate the proper handling of these issues, it might be necessary
for the CFPB to promulgate a form through which consumers could
communicate the legal status of their coerced debts. This could be part of
the document that certified the debts as coerced. After the family court had
listed all the debts that it determined were coerced, the consumer would
mark which ones were no longer legally binding. The CRAs would be
required to accept the consumer’s classifications unless they specifically
determined otherwise. Setting the consumer’s categorization as the default
would prevent the CRAs from making haphazard decisions without examining the evidence, but would enable them to correct the record in cases in
which the consumer designations were inaccurate.
B. Outstanding Debt
Blocking outstanding coerced debt on victims’ credit reports presents a
more complex case. Because I do not propose altering liability for coerced
debt, any blocking of outstanding debt would result in credit reports that
were inaccurate as to the consumer’s outstanding obligations. Information
about current debt is important because it tells the potential creditor
whether the consumer is likely to have funds available to pay the proposed
debt. A consumer who already owes large sums may not be able to pay back
the potential creditor, no matter how strong a debtor she otherwise would
be. In addition, knowledge of current liabilities enables a creditor to predict
304 See Wu, supra note 17, at 174-75 (discussing the credit bureaus’ failure to forward documents to furnishers, which can lead to incorrect outcomes).
305 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4).
306 Compare id. § 1681c(a)(2) (allowing credit reporting agencies to include information about
“civil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest” until the governing statute of limitations has
expired, if this period is longer than seven years), with id. § 1681c(a)(4) (making no such exception
for the statute of limitations).
307 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (2012) (requiring an action to be commenced within six
years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (2011) (three years); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-2-725 (West
2012) (fifteen years).
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how many other creditors would be vying for a debtor’s assets and income
in the event of default.
Thus, I am narrowly tailoring this proposal to cover the credit report
users whose services victims of coerced debt most urgently need: employers,
landlords, and basic utility companies. These users have different needs and
expectations regarding credit reporting, which, on balance, are outweighed
by the needs of victims leaving abusive relationships to establish independent households. This Section will discuss, first, the statutory changes
necessary to effect this reform, and second, a policy analysis that balances
the interests and needs of employers, landlords, and utilities with those of
victims of coerced debt.
1. Statutory Changes
The statutory implementation of this change would be straightforward.
The FCRA defines what types of parties may access consumer credit
reports in a section entitled “Permissible purposes of consumer reports.”308
This provision includes one subsection that covers lenders,309 another that
covers employers,310 and a catch-all subsection that covers landlords and
utilities.311 The FCRA could provide a separate subsection for landlords and
utilities, as it already does for employers. The subsection might state that all
three types of entities have more limited rights vis-à-vis those consumers
who have submitted a certification for the blocking of coerced debt. The
statute would also likely need to state that credit reports blocked in accordance with that section would still be considered “accurate” under other parts
of the statute.312
The CRAs have the technical ability to provide credit reports containing
different information to different types of creditors. They are already
required by law to do so in another situation: when relatively large amounts
of money are at stake. Normally, there is a designated period during which

308
309
310
311

15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(B).
Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i). Some courts have also considered landlords to be covered as creditors under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A). See, e.g., Ferguson v. Park City Mobile Homes, No. 891909, 1989 WL 111916, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1989) (concluding that a lease was a “credit
transaction within the meaning of the FCRA”); Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D. Mass.
1989) (finding that the FCRA applied to a report that a landlord’s association prepared on the
plaintiff).
312 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer
report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”).
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certain items may remain on a consumer’s credit report. For example,
records of accounts placed for collections expire after seven years,313 while
the record of a bankruptcy expires after ten.314 However, if the user is a
potential creditor or insurer considering a transaction reasonably expected
to involve at least $150,000, or a potential employer hiring for a position
with a salary of at least $75,000, these expiration periods do not apply.315 In
addition, as discussed in Part II, the CRAs already provide two different
sets of reports to consumers and potential creditors.
2. Policy Considerations for Employers, Landlords, and Utilities
The use of credit reports by employers, landlords, and basic utility companies is the most urgent issue facing victims of coerced debt. Leaving an
abusive relationship is a make-or-break situation. Someone who may have
been forcibly kept out of the workforce316 or kept financially illiterate317 is
faced with the formidable challenge of starting a self-sufficient household.318
If she fails at this task, she and her children may end up back with the
abuser.319 Thus, the moment when someone attempts to leave an abusive
relationship is the critical time for society at large to affect the rate of
domestic violence. Making it possible for victims to obtain jobs and housing
at that moment may very well reduce domestic violence.
Good credit has become an increasingly important component of basic
economic citizenship, as more employers, landlords, and basic utility
companies have incorporated credit reports into their standard practices.
Employer use of credit reports has risen dramatically in the past several
years—60% of employers conducted credit background checks on at least
some job applicants in 2010.320 Services that provide credit checks specifically to landlords321 and utilities322 have also proliferated. Each of these three
313
314
315
316

Id. § 1681c(a)(4).
Id. § 1681c(a)(1).
Id. § 1681c(b)(1)–(3).
See Littwin, supra note 1, at 953 n.3 (citing reports and articles on the negative effect
domestic violence has on victims’ employment).
317 See id. at 981-86 (discussing the abuser’s financial control as the foundation of coerced debt).
318 See id. at 1000 (stating that domestic violence can “interfere with [the victim’s] ability to
obtain jobs and housing and thus to become economically self-sufficient”).
319 See id. (“[A]n inability to establish a financially viable household apart from the abuser . . .
increases the risk that survivors who have left will return.”).
320 SOC’Y FOR H UMAN RES. MGMT., RESEARCH S POTLIGHT: CREDIT BACKGROUND
CHECKS 1 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Documents/
CCFlier_FINAL.pdf.
321 See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, A Credit Score That Tracks You More Closely, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2011, at B1 (describing a new company that offers rental payment history in credit checks);
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types of institutions has different needs for credit data and different
expectations regarding regulation. I address them in turn.
a. Employers
Employers are the most straightforward case of the three. They are not
creditors of their employees,323 which makes their interest in credit data
more limited than that of other entities. Employers’ access to credit reports
is already controversial, even without adding coerced debt into the mix.
And employers are already covered separately from creditors under the
FCRA, which imposes additional restrictions on them.324
There is an active debate over whether employers should have access to
credit reports at all.325 Eight states have banned employers from running
credit checks in at least some situations,326 and several more have had bills

Landlord Credit Check–FAQs, AAA CREDIT SCREENING SERVICES, http://www.aaacredit.net/
landlord-credit-check.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (offering credit and background screening
particularly to landlords); Welcome, DONOTRENTTO.COM, http://www.donotrentto.com (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012) (allowing landlords to determine the suitability of potential renters); Quality
Tenant Screening Center, LANDLORD.COM, http://www.landlord.com/qts_faqs.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012) (offering screening services to help landlords fill their vacancies).
322 See, e.g., About Us, NAT’L CONSUMER TELECOM & U TIL. EXCHANGE, http://www.
nctue.com/about-us (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (describing itself as a “credit data exchange
service” for the telecommunications and utility industries).
323 Employers are actually debtors of their employees. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
324 The most important FCRA provision requires that employers obtain written releases
from employees before ordering credit checks. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). Employers
must certify to the CRA that they have obtained this permission. Id. § 1681b(b)(1)(A). They are
also required to give employees notice both before and after taking adverse action. Id.
§§ 1681b(3)(A) & 1681m(a).
325 See, e.g., Jeremy M. Simon, TransUnion Asked to Stop Selling Credit Reports to Employers,
CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/transunion-creditreport-employment-hiring-decision-1270.php (discussing an online petition asking TransUnion to
end its sale of credit reports to employers); see also Use of Credit Information Beyond Lending: Issues
and Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. app. 187-88 (2010) [hereinafter Use of Credit Information] (testimony of
Chi Chi Wu, Staff Att’y, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.) (discussing the problems with allowing
employers access to credit information); Kelly Gallagher, Note, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting
Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for “Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1593,
1617 (2006) (proposing that Congress limit employers’ ability to use personal credit information in
hiring decisions).
326 Use of Credit Information in Employment 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-info-in-employ
-2012-legis.aspx; see also, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.320 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020 (2007).
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under consideration in recent years.327 Much of this legislative activity has
been in reaction to the economic downturn that began in 2008. Policymakers are concerned that consumers forced out of work by the recession
will become unemployable because their credit reports will reflect their
inability to pay their bills while unemployed.328 As a union policy report
put it, American consumers are “behind on their bills because they don’t
have a job, but they can’t get a job because they’re behind on their bills.”329
Widespread use of credit reports in employment decisions could lead to a
class of consumers who are permanently unemployable. In addition, there is
a civil rights issue. People of color are disproportionately likely to have low
credit scores,330 so civil rights officials worry that employer use of credit
scores has a disparate impact on these populations, or could even be used as
a pretext for discriminatory hiring decisions.331
To the extent that employers do have a legitimate interest in potential
employee credit histories, it is almost entirely predictive. They have a
327 See Use of Credit Information, supra note 325, at app. 188 (testimony of Chi Chi Wu)
(noting that eighteen states and the District of Columbia have bills pending that would limit
employers’ access to credit information).
328 See Byron Acohido, Credit Checks Used in Hiring, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 2011, at B1 (stating
that the legislative activity in this area is in response to the recession).
329 UNITE H ERE, EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS: A CATCH -22 FOR AMERICAN
WORKERS 1, available at http://www.creditcatch22.org/CreditCatch-22Report.pdf.
330 See, e.g., Use of Credit Information, supra note 325, at app. 189-90 (testimony of Chi Chi
Wu) (noting racial disparities); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND I TS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 80-81 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/RptCongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf (tracking the variations in scores among ethnic
groups); MATT FELLOWES, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT SCORES, REPORTS, AND GETTING
AHEAD IN AMERICA 9 (2006) available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
reports/2006/5/childrenfamilies%20fellowes/20060501_creditscores (“Counties with relatively high
proportions of racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to have lower average credit scores.”);
Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, 2004 FED. RES. BULL. 297, 321,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_credit.pdf (finding an
increased incidence of errors in minority credit reports); Raphael W. Bostic et al., Hitting the Wall:
Credit As an Impediment to Homeownership 13 ( Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ.,
Working Paper No. 482, 2004), available at http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/research/
papers/full/482.pdf (finding that ethnic minorities had lower estimated credit scores).
331 See Acohido, supra note 328 (reporting allegations that “employers are unfairly using
credit histories to weed out the down and out, especially people of color”); Dianna B. Johnston,
Assistant Legal Counsel, EEOC, Informal Discussion Letter re Title VII: Employer Use of Credit
Checks, Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2010/titlevii-employercreditck.html (noting that, because Title VII prohibits practices that disproportionately screen out
racial minorities, if use of credit information does so, it would be illegal); Pre-Employment Inquiries
and Credit Rating or Economic Status, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_
credit.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (stating that such inquiries “generally should be avoided”
because of their disparate impact on women and minorities).
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limited current liabilities interest, because their employees do not owe them
money. This means that data about outstanding debt provide employees
with little value beyond what they can learn from past debt, so the impact
of restricting their access to information about outstanding coerced debt
would be minimal.
Among the reasons why employers seek employee credit data, the only
one that would be affected by my proposal is the belief that employees with
high levels of unpaid debt are more likely to steal from their employers.
This idea, however, rests on assumptions that are not supported by the
scant empirical research in this area. In a recent survey by the Society for
Human Resource Management (SHRM), 45% of polled human resources
representatives said that the reason they performed credit checks was to
“reduce/prevent theft[,] embezzlement[, and] other criminal activity.”332
The logic is that an “employee who is heavily burdened by debt could be
more likely to embezzle or steal”333 in order to make up the shortfall on her
personal balance sheet. This reason would apply to victims of coerced debt
because, even though they were not the ones who incurred a blocked debt,
they would still be liable for paying it. If one were motivated to steal to pay
one’s liabilities, it would not matter how the debts were created.
The problem with this theory is that there is no research supporting
334
it. There appear to have been only two studies ever conducted on the
matter, and neither found a link between debt and theft. The first was a
1983 study, which found that “employees who reported having personal economic problems were no more theft-prone that those who did not.”335 The
other, conducted in 2003, found “no benefit from using credit history to
332 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING—THE USE OF CREDBACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS 10 (2012), available at http://www.shrm.org/
Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/CriminalBackgroundCheck.aspx (click on “click here”).
333 David Lorango, Why Do New Employers Need Your Credit Score?, EHOW, http://www.
ehow.com/facts_5748998_do-employers-need-credit-score_.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
334 A 2006 law review note did a similar search and obtained the same results that I did: a
plethora of popular-press and trade articles advising employers to run credit checks to prevent
employee theft but no empirical support for this recommendation. See Gallagher, supra note 325,
at 1595 n.3 (“Despite articles in business and trade journals stating that ‘there is obviously a
reason’ to perform a credit check on bookkeepers and other individuals handling cash, . . . none
that I have found reference any data suggesting any correlation between credit score and job
performance or likelihood to steal from an employer.”); see also Use of Credit Information, supra note
325, at app. 191 (testimony of Chi Chi Wu) (“There is no evidence showing that people with weak
credit are more likely to be bad employees or to steal from their bosses.”).
335 Richard C. Hollinger, Why Do Our Employees Steal?, in RETAIL CRIME, SECURITY , AND
LOSS PREVENTION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC REFERENCE 608, 608 (Charles A. Sennewald &
John H. Christman eds., 2008). Social scientists have developed a model of employee theft, and
“motivation” is only one of three contributing factors. The other two are “opportunity” and
“deterrence.” Of the three, deterrence is the most important. Id.
IT
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predict employee performance or turnover.”336 Even a CRA spokesperson
recently conceded in legislative testimony that there was not any evidence
for this link.337
There is also a more general version of this theory, but it is not implicated by my policy proposal. Approximately 12% of the hiring managers in
the SHRM poll said that they used credit reports to evaluate “overall
trustworthiness.”338 The theory is that if a person is responsible in one
sector of her life, she will be responsible in another. Or it can be framed
more specifically for finance-oriented jobs—the category for which employers are most likely to run credit checks339—and stated as the proposition
that a person who has successfully managed his own finances is more likely
to have success managing a business’s.340 But as many commentators have
pointed out in the general debate over employer access to credit data,
factors beyond an individual’s control can lower her credit rating.341 This
reasoning applies even more strongly to coerced debt, which will have been
certified by a court as not belonging to the person on whose credit report it
appears.
Employers also use credit checks to avoid potential liability for torts
such as negligent hiring342 and to check for misrepresentation of employee
credentials,343 but my proposal would not harm employers on either of these
grounds. An employer likely would not be held liable for information to

336 Laura Koppes Bryan & Jerry K. Palmer, Do Job Applicant Credit Histories Predict Performance Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions?, 15 PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. 106, 123
(2012).
337 Liz Weston, Could You Be Fired for Bad Credit?, MSN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2010 9:00 AM),
http://money.msn.com/Credit-Rating/could-you-be-fired-for-bad-credit-weston.aspx (quoting the
testimony of Eric Rosenberg, state government liaison for TransUnion, to Oregon legislators, “At
this point we don’t have any research to show any statistical correlation between what’s in
somebody’s credit report and their job performance or their likelihood to commit fraud.”).
338 SOC’Y FOR H UMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 332, at 10.
339 Id. at 16.
340 As one industrial psychologist put it, “If you cannot organize your finances, how are you
going to responsibly organize yourself for a company?” Diane E. Lewis, Qualification: Must Have a
Good Credit History, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2006, at E1.
341 See, e.g., Use of Credit Information, supra note 325, at app. 191 (testimony of Chi Chi Wu)
(noting that “many people end up with a negative credit rating for reasons they can’t control”).
342 In the 2012 SHRM poll, 22% of human resource managers listed reducing liability for
negligent hiring as the primary reason for using credit checks. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES.
MGMT., supra note 332, at 10; see also Gallagher, supra note 325, at 1599 (listing liability concerns
as one motivating factor in employers’ decisions to obtain credit reports for potential employees).
343 See John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom To Hire: Rampant Misrepresentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (characterizing employees’ misrepresentation of credentials as an
“epidemic”).
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which it was denied access on an employee’s credit report, and blocking
coerced debt would not interfere with employers’ verification of items on
job applicant resumes.
Interestingly, the one current liabilities interest that employers may
have in knowing about employees’ current coerced debt is not among the
reasons that employers give for ordering employee credit reports.344 The
issue is the potential effect of collection attempts and financial stress on the
job performance of heavily indebted employees. When a debt is in default,
creditors can and do call the debtor at work to increase their leverage and
thereby increase their odds of repayment.345 In addition, defaulting debtors
may have their cars repossessed346 or find themselves unable to concentrate
on their work.347 These factors can therefore have negative effects on
debtors’ employers.
However, just as in the credit context,348 there are already many other
factors that could negatively affect a person’s job performance about which
employers are prohibited from inquiring. For example, employers are
denied access to information about health diagnoses,349 mental health
issues,350 and child-bearing intentions,351 despite these conditions’ potential
effects on future job performance. These policies were enacted because our
society prioritizes a level playing field in the job market over certain
employer interests. Policymakers have determined that society as a whole
benefits from a work force that does not discriminate against, for example,
diabetics, people who have suffered from depression, and women of child344
345

See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 332, at 10 (not listing financial stress).
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits “debt collectors” from calling debtors at
work, but “debt collectors” is defined to include only third-party collections, not collections by the
creditor itself. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006) (defining “debt collector” to include only an entity
that “collects . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”); id. § 1692c(a)(3)
(prohibiting a “debt collector” from contacting a consumer at his or her workplace if the debt
collector has reason to know that the employer prohibits such communication).
346 See U.C.C. § 9-609 (2012) (allowing secured creditors to repossess their collateral as long
as the repossession does not involve a breach of the peace).
347 See, e.g., Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry? Debt Management in Financially
Distressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 151 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (linking financial hardship to increased stress, insomnia, and depression).
348 See supra subsection III.A.1.
349 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2008) (“[A] covered entity shall not conduct a
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.”).
350 Id.
351 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (amending Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act to state that the prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” or “on
the basis of sex” “include[s], but [is] not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions”).
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bearing age. Victims of coerced debt need this same protection. Otherwise,
barriers to entering the work force could make it prohibitively difficult for
them to become sufficiently financially independent to remain free of
abusive relationships.
b. Utilities
Unlike employers, utility providers and landlords are creditors; their
customers and tenants owe them money. These entities therefore have a
strong interest in viewing their applicants’ credit reports because other
outstanding debts could affect their ability to pay. If an applicant is paying
down a large coerced debt, the money she uses for these payments will not
be available for her utility bills or rent. Thus, an outstanding coerced debt
that is blocked from the consumer’s credit report could have a negative
impact on her utility company or landlord. Nevertheless, because of the
essential nature of the services they provide, these entities already have
reduced rights and expectations when compared with financial-sector
creditors, and on balance, it is reasonable to ask them to bear the risk of
remaining ignorant of applicants’ coerced debts.
In addition to providing fundamental services, basic utilities, such as gas
and electric companies, are natural monopolies.352 These two factors
combine to make the public utility industry among the most highly regulated
in the United States. The heavy governance of utility providers is so
normalized that commentators discussing financial institutions frequently
contrast them with utilities to show why regulation should not apply in the
financial sector.353
Utility companies’ ability to adjust for the riskiness of individual customers is already correspondingly compromised. They are, for the most
352 Public utility monopolies survive because “[t]he high fixed costs of building a plant are
such that no second company can enter the market at a cost below that which the incumbent can
charge for its services, even if allowed to do so as a matter of law.” Richard A. Epstein, Durbin's
Folly: The Erratic Course of Debit Card Markets?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2011, at 58, 66.
353 See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability:
The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability
Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 789 n.343 (1994) (rejecting for lenders one approach to setting
usury rates, that of “setting a ceiling consistent with industry risks and costs, as a public utilities
commission would do”); Epstein, supra note 352, at 67 (“[T]here are . . . major differences between
the debit interchange market and standard public utility regulation . . . . [R]ate regulation here is
imposed on what is a virtual competitive industry, where any pocket of monopoly power is tiny
relative to the systemic long-term territorial monopoly of the standard public utility.”); see also
Jarret C. Oeltjen, Usury: Utilitarian or Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 167, 222 (1975) (“To
attempt to regulate credit as a public utility would be a major error . . . .” (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Milton Friedman, Defense of Usury, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1970, at 79)).
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part, not allowed to select their customers354 or to price discriminate.355
They must follow frequently elaborate procedures before terminating
existing customers,356 and in many states, they must regularly notify their
customers of their rights to fight disconnection.357 Thus, utility providers
already engage in massive cross-subsidization—from the financially stable
customers to the poor, from the urban to the rural,358 and even from the
winter customers to the summer.359 Adding victims of coerced debt to the
mix would not disrupt this business model.
Utilities would, however, experience some harm from the blocking of
outstanding coerced debt. One of the few tools utilities may use to manage
customer risk is demanding upfront deposits,360 and it is in the process of
determining deposit requirements that utility companies run credit
checks.361 In my preliminary study of coerced debt, the DV advocates I
interviewed pointed to high deposits as an important barrier to their clients’

354 Public utilities have a “duty to serve,” which “means that utilities must provide service to
any member of the public living within the utility’s service area who has applied for service and is
willing to pay for the service and comply with the utility’s rules and regulations.” NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., DEALING WITH UTILITY COMPANIES 1 (2010), available at http://www.
nclc.org/images/pdf/older_consumers/consumer_facts/cf_dealing_with_utility_companies.pdf.
355 For this reason, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook refer to them as “maladjusting” or
“quasi-involuntary” creditors in their study of the ability of different types of creditors to riskadjust under proposals for private, corporate bankruptcy regimes. Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1197, 1216, 1230 (2005).
356 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 354, at 2 (outlining the many steps a utility
must take before terminating service).
357 JOHN HOWAT & JULIA DEVANTHARY, NAT’L C ONSUMER LAW CTR., PUBLIC S ERVICE COMMISSION CONSUMER PROTECTION R ULES AND REGULATIONS 5 (2006), available
at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/additional_resources/resource_guide
.pdf (“Some states require companies to regularly provide information to consumers regarding
payment assistance and the right to file a consumer complaint or dispute billing amounts.”).
358 See id. (“Th[e] obligation to serve prevents utility companies from choosing to serve only
the most profitable customers and geographic areas.”).
359 In Massachusetts, for example, “utilities are prohibited from terminating service between
November 15 and April 15 in households were [sic] there is financial hardship.” Id. at 7.
360 See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, supra note 355, at 1230 (“Most public utilities make some
effort to protect themselves from risk of loss by requiring deposits prior to initiating service and
by threatening to cut off service if the debtor becomes delinquent.”).
361 The NCLC conducted a study with regulatory officials from ten states to learn about
their utilities’ written rules and informal practices. One finding was that “[t]he common theme
that state [public utility companies] reported was that utilities tend to use payment history with
past providers as a basis for evaluating whether to impose a security deposit.” HOWAT &
DEVANTHARY, supra note 357, at 11; see also Robert W. Seifert, Home Sick: How Medical Debt
Undermines Housing Security, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 325, 343 (2007) (“In some cases, people with
low credit scores have been required to pay higher utility deposits.”).
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economic self-sufficiency.362 But even in determining deposit requirements,
utilities’ freedom is not absolute. In several states, they have discretion to
determine whether to require a deposit, but not to determine the amount.363
Because utility deposit-setting practices are already so constrained, removing one piece of information from utilities’ purview would not make a major
difference in deposit requests. If blocking coerced debt were to become
costly for utilities, they could use that as an argument for small rate increases and spread the loss across the entire body of utility customers.
c. Landlords
Landlords present the most difficult case of the three actors because, like
utilities, they are creditors, but unlike utilities, they cannot compensate for
potential losses through the power of monopoly status. Landlords do,
however, control access to an essential resource without which survivors of
domestic violence cannot establish independence. This issue has been
recognized by the national and state laws that prohibit property managers
from discriminating on the basis of domestic violence history.
The main reason to apply a full credit-reporting block to landlords is to
prevent victims of coerced debt from becoming part of the class of “unhouseables.”364 This refers to an emerging category of people who cannot
obtain rental housing because of a disqualifying event, such as an eviction,
criminal record, or period of homelessness.365 If they do find housing, they
often have to pay application fees to several landlords before obtaining it.366
Since this problem has become more prevalent as background screening has

362 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 1001 (describing an interview with a lawyer whose client was
required to pay a $1500 deposit to turn on utilities in her apartment).
363 See HOWAT & DEVANTHARY, supra note 357, at 11 (“Unlike the unencumbered decisions
made about whether to demand security deposits, states in the sample reported rather narrow
parameters for determining the amount that a ‘risky’ customer must pay. The upper limits on
deposits did not exceed twice the highest bill at the address and hovered more often around twice
the average bill.”).
364 This term appears to have been coined by Eric Dunn and Marina Grabchuk. Eric Dunn
& Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary Residential Tenant-Screening
Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 319, 337 (2010).
365 See id.
366 See Jonathan Grant, Tenant Screening: A Housing Barrier for the 21st Century, SOLID
GROUND BLOG ( Jan. 21, 2010), http://solidgroundblog.wordpress.com/2010/01/21/tenant-screen
ing-a-housing-barrier-for-the-21st-century (“Currently residents in Washington State are hit with
repeated fees in background checks for housing applications, often paying hundreds of dollars . . . .”).
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become increasingly accessible,367 it is important to remove victims of
coerced debt from this category.
The legal system has already recognized the crucial role of providing
access to housing for DV victims and survivors by preventing landlords
from discriminating against them in many circumstances. My proposal
simply fills an important gap in this protection. Recently, lawyers have
argued that housing discrimination against DV survivors violates the Fair
Housing Act’s (FHA) ban on gender discrimination.368 This use of the
FHA is still relatively novel, and there is currently only one federal case on
point.369 Additionally, since 2005, the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) has provided unambiguous antidiscrimination protection for DV
victims and survivors living in federally subsidized housing.370 Moreover,
six states and the District of Columbia have enacted provisions that explicitly prevent discrimination against victims of domestic violence in all types
of housing.371 An overlapping group of twelve states and the District of
Columbia have also enacted provisions that allow DV victims to break their
leases without penalty in order to escape abuse.372 These statutes may

367 “[T]echnological advances gave rise to the tenant screening industry, revolutionizing the
largely manual business of gathering public and financial records into one that is now primarily
automated.” HOUSING LINK, TENANT SCREENING AGENCIES IN THE TWIN CITIES: AN
OVERVIEW OF TENANT SCREENING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON RENTERS 9
(2004), available at http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Tenant_Screening.pdf.
368 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.”).
369 See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005) (allowing a case to
proceed to a jury on grounds of alleged discrimination on the basis of religion and gender when
the landlord evicted a tenant following an incident of domestic violence).
370 This part of VAWA covers all Section 8 units and most public housing projects. HUD
Programs: Violence Against Women Act Conforming Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,336 (Nov. 28,
2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 24 C.F.R).
371 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-107.5(5)(c)(I) (2011); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A,
562B.25A (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-33 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-1, et. seq. (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.130 (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.50 (West 2012). See also NAT’L
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HOUSING 2,
available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/Housing_.pdf (collecting state law provisions that protect
DV survivors’ access to housing).
372 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2011); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.352 (West 2012); see also SANDRA PARK, FAIR HOUSING FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 22 (2008), available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/
ACLU_Park_Webinar_Gender_Discrimination.pdf (listing the laws of Arizona, California,
Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, New York, Oregon,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin as jurisdictions that allow early lease terminations by DV
victims).
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indeed cause landlords some economic harm,373 but policymakers have
determined that DV victims’ need for housing and safety outweighs that
risk. The same policy considerations apply to victims of coerced debt.
It is important, however, to put this potential harm to landlords in perspective. Consumers tend to prioritize their rental payments,374 and they are
particularly likely to prioritize rent over credit card debt.375 Therefore,
landlords are likely to fare well in payment competitions with financialsector creditors, many of whom will be collecting on past debt rather than
offering future credit by the time a consumer is in the position of having to
choose. For current tenants, landlords are always offering future benefits in
the form of continued residence on the property.
Property managers also typically require one- to three-months’ rent upfront,376 which has the effect of forcing tenants to immediately internalize
their rental costs. If a consumer could not afford the rent—for example
because she was making payments on a coerced debt that was blocked on
her credit report—she would likely not be able to afford the large initial
payments required to sign a lease. Accordingly, there is a relatively limited
set of circumstances in which a landlord would initially rent to a victim of
coerced debt and then later be harmed by her inability to pay. This would
occur only when the consumer was not paying a coerced debt at the time
she began the lease but became required to pay it—for example by a lawsuit
or garnishment—during the course of the tenancy. Nevertheless, there
could be an exception for small landlords who cannot spread potential losses
among a large number of tenants, perhaps modeled on the exception in
the FHA.377
373 For example, former abusive partners of survivors who have obtained housing under the
antidiscrimination laws may stalk victims and cause property damage or disturb neighbors. The
early lease termination provisions may cause landlords some economic harm when they cannot
easily replace the former tenant.
374 See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 37, at 478 (describing how low-income women in a small
study prioritized their rent payments above other expenses).
375 Id.
376 Moreover, these amounts are usually predetermined rather than calculated in response to
a rental applicant’s credit history. See, e.g., How Much Security Deposit Can a Landlord Charge? What
Can It Be Used for?, NOLO (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/leases-rentalagreements-faq-29104-4.html (noting that landlords may ask for one or two month’s rent just for
the security deposit).
377 The FHA exception applies to “any single-family house sold or rented by an owner:
Provided, That such private individual owner does not own more than three such single-family
houses at any one time” and “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or
intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the
owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b)(1)–(2) (2006).
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In addition to potential nonpayment of rent, there are other harms that
landlords may experience as a result of renting to victims of coerced debt.
As victims of domestic violence, they may be subject to stalking and
harassment, which may result in damage to property or disturb other
tenants. However, these concerns apply to all victims of domestic violence,
not just to victims of coerced debt, and the decision about whether to allow
landlords access to information about rental applicants’ DV histories should
be made on its own merits. Otherwise, some victims of domestic violence
(those with coerced debt) will have less access to housing than others (those
without coerced debt) for reasons unrelated to the concerns that landlords
may have about them as tenants. My view is that the equities balance in
favor of DV victims. Constraining victims’ access to housing—which in
cities with tight housing markets may mean eliminating their access to
housing—creates barriers for victims attempting to establish independent
households, which in turn, increases the difficulty of leaving abusive
relationships. But here, too, I would not object to an exception for small
landlords who may not be able to bear these risks.
Finally, the administrative implementation of this proposal would not
be difficult for property managers. Rather than ordering credit reports
directly, most landlords use specialized tenant-screening services,378 which
provide additional information and recommendations. As specialists, these
services are very familiar with credit reporting law and could easily adjust.
In sum, employers, utility companies, and landlords have characteristics
that distinguish them from financial-sector creditors and make the removal
of current liabilities information from their purview less problematic than it
would be for lenders. On the other side of the equation, the jobs and
services they provide are essential for victims of coerced debt who are
attempting to start new households apart from the abuse.
CONCLUSION
When one considers how important credit reports have become, the
state of the current system for compiling them and overseeing their accuracy is shocking. The CRAs use loose matching algorithms that virtually
ensure errors and enable fraud, and they have no meaningful process for
correcting the inaccuracies that occur. At some point, these conditions may
lead to demands for reform, although the “VIP” system that provides higher
quality service to people with a better ability to insist on change probably
378 A 2004 study of tenant-screening practices in Minnesota found that 72% of property
managers used tenant-screening agencies. HOUSING LINK, supra note 367, at 6.
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acts as a brake on any such calls. If and when reform happens, victims of
coerced debt will benefit.
In the meantime, the best approach is to remove decisions about coerced
debt from CRAs. Since CRAs cannot meaningfully evaluate a consumer’s
claim that she is not the same person as someone with a similar address and
the same first initial, they cannot possibly evaluate the much more complex
factual assertions that surround coerced debt.
Moving decisionmaking about coerced debt to family courts does place
more pressure on the existing processes for addressing domestic violence,
but these systems also provide grounds for optimism. In a relatively short
period of time, the modern domestic violence movement has successfully
created a paradigmatic shift379 that has changed the terms of the discussion
and brought vast improvements to nearly every type of institution that
serves victims and survivors.380 If change can come to a system that was
shielded by centuries of common law,381 it can come to our credit reporting
system, which is—no matter how ubiquitous it may seem now—only a few
decades old.382

379 See Patricia Tjaden, Defining and Measuring Violence Against Women: Background, Issues, and
Recommendations, 22 STAT. J. UN 217, 218 (2005) (explaining shifts in the “violence against women
paradigm”).
380 Id.
381 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (“[T]he husband and wife
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.”); see also
Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 10 (1999) (tracing state approval of
domestic violence back to British common law, through the American colonial period, and into the
twentieth century).
382 Equifax, the oldest of the three major credit bureaus, began in 1899, but the other two did
not emerge until 1968 (TransUnion) and 1980 (Experian). See Jim Wang, History of Credit Bureaus:
Equifax, Experian, TransUnion & Innovis, BARGAINEERING, http://www.bargaineering.com/
articles/history-of-credit-bureaus-equifax-experian-transunion-innovis.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2012). Credit reporting did not become widespread until the 1990s. Hendricks, supra note 116, at
42.

